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ANALYSIS (U)

The OV-1 system was, and is, the only Army surveillance system capable of over-watching large geographic areas with a variety of sensor devices and the ability to relay target information to tactical users as the sensors detect them. However, the tactical troop unit build-up in Vietnam preceeded the in-put of the Mohawk units required to support their tactical operations which ranged over large and difficult areas. The sparsity of available OV-1s during the 1965-67 period detracted from the system's built-in response to user capability. An integral part of the system, the GST, was never available in sufficient quantities nor reliable enough for the system to operate as originally designed and this too degraded its ability to respond. The concept of a Surveillance Airplane Company at the Corps/Field Force level was considered valid by senior commanders in Vietnam; however, the variety of terrain found in Vietnam tends to argue against a one-for-one issue basis and supports a modular concept permitting flexibility in the number and type of sensors more compatible to the operational environment rather than the standard TO&E type SAC.⁶³ Field commanders in Vietnam applied continuous pressure on Mohawk units for their use in a pure target acquisition role, a role for which the system was not specifically designed. Although many of the improvisations and tactics designed met with some success, an analysis of the

⁶³USARV Survey.

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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS (U)

(U) ~~Contingency planning for an intelligence force structure for major US military involvement in the Vietnam War was inadequate.~~ The only exception being at the USARPAC level where minimum force structures for Vietnam and Thailand were prepared and a Military Intelligence Battalion was deployed for use in Vietnam. US intelligence buildup in 1965-1966 lagged behind the commitment of US ground forces because of the lack of intelligence units and resources in the active Army. Major shortages existed in all major officer and enlisted MOSs and the CONUS training base was not responsive in terms of numbers or instructional material to MACV's requirements.

(U) Major overseas US military intelligence activity must be planned in such detail that it is provided adequate and qualified personnel resources. It must be unified and must be directed and controlled through intelligence channels to capitalize on its resources and to exploit the available intelligence data.

(U) The organization and techniques described clearly reveal the shortcomings in the MACV Advisory effort in the field of intelligence. However, a unified intelligence effort utilizing the same basic organizational structure as was developed in the PHOENIX program and the modus operandi that is taught at the USAINTS would have provided a more effective, broad-based Joint/Combined intelligence effort in the RVN. The expertise of military Combat

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Intelligence and Counterintelligence training, however, was a major contribution to the overall success of the effort in Vietnam and will be in the future. From the analysis it may be concluded that the Military Intelligence community can deduce a simplified, but effective, role for Military Intelligence that would not require new organization or additional personnel, but rather would provide flexibility by training intelligence personnel in both tactical and political intelligence. The study of subjects dealing with the political nature of "wars of liberation," and case studies in Communist political clandestine infrastructures as they exist in potentially hostile areas is essential. Improved language and area orientation training are absolutely necessary to equip Military Intelligence personnel properly for duties such as they performed in Vietnam. Moreover, general college education can never be considered a substitute for branch and MOS training.

~~US~~ US Army doctrine, particularly in the field of advising indigenous forces in matters of Combat Intelligence, Counterintelligence, [and Clandestine Collection] should be reflected in every USAINTS course to ensure that Military Intelligence personnel have an appreciation for each effort regardless of their particular intelligence specialization. This is particularly important because the personnel shortfalls in Vietnam forced the assignment of intelligence personnel into every facet of Combat Intelligence and police advisory duties despite their prior specialization.

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(c) The extreme proliferation of agent operations in Vietnam indicate a pressing need for the development of tactical HUMINT concepts and doctrine which will insure for adequate operational coordination and control. In this respect, the Army should review its overall HUMINT role to adjust priorities in both the strategic and tactical collection areas. There also appears to be a critical requirement to review concepts of operations for combined, or unilateral, efforts with special emphasis placed on the importance of working in concert with foreign intelligence personnel and organizations.

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EXCERPT (b) (1)

(u) [REDACTED] The Army must recognize the need for a single-purpose, dedicated communications system to support its intelligence organization at all echelons from the individual collector to the theater headquarters. Vietnam has proven that existing authorizations for communications personnel and equipment in the intelligence field are simply inadequate. In addition to improving the overall communications capability of intelligence units and staffs, there remains a most important requirement to develop a small, effective agent radio that can withstand the rigors of hostile environments. There is no technological or other excuse for the failure to develop this vital communications means.

(c) Experience in Vietnam has also revealed a critical need for an increased tour length for HUMINT personnel patterned after

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the Province Senior Advisor program to permit conduct of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] operations without the frequent turnover [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

EXEMPT (b) (1)

(U) Intelligence organization and command relationships are extremely important to exploit fully the capabilities of the intelligence specialties available. Vietnam witnessed widespread misuse of such personnel primarily due to a failure to maintain an intelligence structure, under the control of the J2, that would have been responsive, more effective, and less overlapping. In this respect, during a buildup phase such as occurred in 1965, the key commanders of Military Intelligence units should be specifically selected based on experience and operational knowledge rather than rank and the necessity for command experience. Many of the shortcomings outlined above would not have developed had more experienced personnel been initially present in the key field command positions.

(U) The future potential of the sensor has yet to be fully realized. The Unattended Ground Sensor system of the future offers a broad spectrum of possible uses, some of which are:

Real-time intelligence to cope with highly mobile forces-- both friendly and enemy.

Permitting the commander to use his tactical mobility to concentrate his forces at the right place and at the right time.

Facilitating closer integration of air and artillery fire power.

Providing information simultaneously to all echelons in near real-time.

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Surveillance of large portions of the battle area with expendible sensors instead of people.

It would be impossible to list all of the possible future uses of UGS. They are limited only by the imagination and foresight by the planners of the future Army.

(U) Future developments of UGS as part of the surveillance screen of the "automated battlefield" require a more flexible concept in their use than has been noted in Vietnam. The sensor is an excellent intelligence-producing device with a target acquisition capability and field experience indicates that there is more reliance on the intelligence function as the primary role for the sensor. The UGS should be part of the intelligence system at all echelons of command to enhance the integration of the system with other surveillance systems. Currently, UGS remain part of the J3 operational staff responsibility at MACV although subordinate commands have long since shifted this responsibility to the intelligence side of the house. The intelligence staff must not lose this valuable collection means by forfeit and must provide the doctrinal guidance which is so lacking at the present time.

(C) The Mohawk OV-1 system received a good test during operations in Vietnam, but it did not receive a complete test of all its capabilities because of the late arrival of SAC units in Vietnam, the lack of equipment, particularly GSTs, and the pressure of circumstances to assume the role of target acquisition for which it possesses minimum system capabilities. If one conclusion can

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be drawn from the experience of Mohawks in Vietnam, it is that tactical commanders need a wide-ranging aerial surveillance system, immediately responsive to their tactical needs, which possesses system characteristics to enable it to perform equally well in an aerial surveillance or target acquisition role.

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APPENDIX 1 (U)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNITS ACTIVATED

AT FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

Unit

| | | | |
|---------|-------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|
| Jan 66 | 45th MI Co (II) | Apr 67 | 628th MID (OB) |
| Jan 66 | MID USASSG | Apr 67 | 629th MID (OB) |
| Mar 66 | 25th MID (Div Spt) | Apr 67 | 630th MID (Photo Lib) |
| May 66 | 219th MID (Corps-Spt) | Apr 67 | 631st MID (Admin Hqs Aug) |
| May 66 | MID USASSG | Apr 67 | 641st MID (CI Aug) |
| May 66 | MID USASSG | Apr 67 | 703d MID (CI Aug) |
| May 66 | MID USASSG | Apr 67 | 636th MID (OB) |
| May 66 | MID USASSG | May 67 | 633d MID (Interrog Aug) |
| May 66 | MID USASSG | May 67 | 634th MID (OB Aug) |
| Aug 66 | 571st MID (Admin Aug) | May 67 | 585th MID (DAME) |
| Sep 66 | 572d MID (Admin Aug) | Jul 67 | MID (1 Amb1) |
| Sep 66 | 573d MID | Jul 67 | MID IFFV |
| Sep 66 | 574th MID | Jul 67 | 584th MID (Int Aug) |
| Sep 66 | 575th MID | Jul 67 | 583d MID (Int Aug) |
| Sep 66 | 576th MID | Aug 67 | 582d MID (Interrog) |
| Sep 66 | 577th MID | Sep 67 | 55th MID (OB) |
| Sep 66 | 578th MID | Sep 67 | 200th MID (CI Aug) |
| Sep 66 | 579th MID (CI) | Sep 67 | 202d MID (OB) |
| Sep 66 | 580th MID (CI Aug) | Sep 67 | 204th MID (OB) |
| Sep 66 | 569th MID (Spt Bde) | Dec 67 | 635th MID (Sep Inf Bde) |
| Sep 66 | 541st MID (ACR) | Dec 67 | 62d MID (Spt Bde) |
| Sep 66 | 12th MID (Coll) | Dec 67 | 101st MID (Div Spt) |
| Sep 66 | 4th MID (Div Spt) | Feb 68 | 82d MID (Div Spt) |
| Sep 66 | 185th MI Co (II) | | |
| Sep 66 | 149th MI Gp | | |
| Sep 66 | 135th MI Gp | | |
| Oct 66 | 184th MI Co (Coll) (less Det) | | |
| Oct 66 | 702d MID (Corps Spt) | | |
| Nov 66 | 568th MID (Coll) | | |
| Dec 66 | 570th MID (Coll) | | |
| Jan 67 | 9th MID (Div Spt) | | |
| Jan 67 | 581st MID (Admin Ha-Agu) | | |
| Jan 67 | 614th MID (Interrog) | | |
| Jan 67 | MID USASSG | | |
| Jan 67 | 588th MID (CI Aug) | | |
| 29Apr67 | 612th MID (Coll) | | |
| Apr 67 | 586th MID (CI Aug) | | |
| Apr 67 | 615th MID (Tltr) | | |
| Apr 67 | 616th MID (Tltr Aug) | | |
| Apr 67 | 627th MID (Tltr Aug) | | |

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APPENDIX 2

SURVEY OF USARV COMMANDERS ON EFFECTIVENESS
OF MOHAWKS IN VIETNAM, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1968 (U)

1. QUESTION: ^(u) WHAT IS YOUR EVALUATION (CAPABILITIES/LIMITATIONS) OF EACH OF THE MOHAWK SUBSYSTEMS (PHOTO, SLAR, IR) WHEN RELATED TO THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: JUNGLE, MOUNTAINS, SAVANNA, COASTAL AREAS, DELTA?

LTG Peers:
(CG, I FFV)

Jungle: Photo [REDACTED] IR - [REDACTED]
SLAR - [REDACTED]

Mountains: Photo [REDACTED] IR [REDACTED]
SLAR - [REDACTED]

Coastal: Photo [REDACTED] IR [REDACTED]
SLAR - [REDACTED]

Delta: No comment.

Savanna: Not significant.

LTG Kerwin:
(CG, II FFV)

Jungle: Photo [REDACTED] IR - [REDACTED] SLAR [REDACTED]

Mountains: Photo [REDACTED] IR [REDACTED]
SLAR - [REDACTED]

Coastal: Photo [REDACTED] IR [REDACTED] SLAR [REDACTED]

Savanna/Delta: Photo [REDACTED] IR - [REDACTED]
SLAR - Same as IR.

SUCCESS (b) (1)

MG Eckhardt
(SA, IV Corps)

Photo: Capability of OV-1 over all types of terrain
is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SLAR - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IR - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

BG Schweiter: Jungle: [REDACTED]
(C/S, XXIV Corps)

Mountains: SLAR - [REDACTED]
IR [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Photo - [REDACTED]

Coastal: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

MG Forsythe
(CG, 1st Cav
Div)

Photo: Missions provide [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

IR: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SLAR: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

MG Ware: .
(CG, 1st Inf
Div)

Jungle: SLAR - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IR - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Mountains: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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Savanna: [REDACTED]

Delta: Majority of all SLAR returns in southern TAOI. [REDACTED]

MG Stone
(CG, 4th Inf
Div)

Mountains & Jungle: [REDACTED]

Savanna & Delta: N/A.

MG Ewell:
(CG, 9th Inf
Div)

Jungle: [REDACTED]

MG Williamson
(CG, 25th Inf
Div)

Jungle: [REDACTED] Photo -
[REDACTED] SLAR
[REDACTED] IR
[REDACTED]

MG Getty
(CG, Americal
Div)

Mountainous jungle: IR
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SLAR -
[REDACTED] Photo -
[REDACTED]

Coastal: IR and SLAR
[REDACTED]

SUSCSEZ (M) (1)

MC Zais
..(CG, 101st ABN
Div)

Photo and IR cannot be evaluated by this hqs since no photo and only two IR missions have been flown within the past 60 days for this division. All 101st Division requests are forwarded through XXIV Corps to III MAF where the decision is made on the type of aircraft that will be employed. (Requesting units cannot specify aircraft.) Since III MAF has elected to fill the majority of our requests with USAF or USMC assets, little experience has been gained on the Mohawk. SLAR - The division AO is covered twice nightly by Mohawk SLAR. SLAR is being used

8150562 (b) (1)

2. QUESTION: (u) WHICH SUBSYSTEMS HAVE PROVIDED THE MOST INFORMATION TO YOUR COMMAND? LEAST?

LTG Peers IR - Most information. Used for immediate reaction.
 Photo: No comment.
 SLAR - Least.

LTG Kerwin: Photo - Most effective.
 SLAR - N/C.
 IR - Least, but both photo and IR compliment each other.

MG Eckhardt: IR and SLAR provide the most information in IV CTZ.
 Photo - The least due to VC moving at night.

BG Schweiter: IR - Has the most potential in spite of its limitations.
 SLAR - Ranks second.
 Photo - Third.
 VR - Fourth.

MG Forsythe: The subsystems which provide the most valuable information in our present AO are ranked in order of importance:
 1. Photo
 2. IR
 3. SLAR. SLAR is for the most part marginal in present AO.

MG Ware: SLAR - Effective for detection of sampams, general VC movement trends.
 IR - Least.
 Photo - Most.

MG Stone: - IR - Provides the majority of info furnished by Mohawks.
 SLAR [REDACTED]
 Photo - Least, though it is valuable to recon and surveillance effort.

MG Ewell: SLAR - Has provided the most information.
 Photo - The least.

SUSCSEB (b) (4)

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MG Williamson: Photo - Allows max number of people to plan operations, develop LZs, with minimum cost.
SLAR - Good potential with GSTs.
IR - Least, but has the greatest potential with GSTs.

MG Getty: IR - Has provided most information.
Photo - Least. Photo subsystem has not been used much because of limited coverage. Mohawks; however, have been more responsive than Air Force. There is a 1 to 2 day delay in getting Mohawk photos whereas it takes more than two days for USAF.

MG Zais: It is not possible to compare the three systems because IR and photo have not been provided.

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3. QUESTION: (b) [REDACTED] HAS THE OV-1 PROVIDED YOU WITH INFORMATION NOT OBTAINABLE BY ANY OTHER MEANS? IF SO, WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION? HOW FREQUENTLY? WHAT VALUE?

LTG Peers: When employed regularly the OV-1 provides valuable information not obtainable by any other means. [REDACTED] IR provided 128 targets for 173rd Bde in July. 65 were taken under fire.

LTG Kerwin: SLAR provides indications not obtainable by any other means. SLAR is used daily and is valuable for determining [REDACTED]

MG Eckhardt: Nightly SLAR coverage accounts for 83% of the delta and 100% of the coastal area. SLAR is the major source of information [REDACTED] Over 600 IR missions flown per month. Coverage could be augmented by USAF but they are not able to provide extensive number of missions for IV CTZ. Their capability is utilized for large area targets. OV-1 IR revealed one of the largest weapons and supply caches ever captured in IV CTZ in Chau Doc Province.

BG Schweiter: SLAR has provided [REDACTED] Mohawk systems are more responsive than other services.

MG Forsythe: Mohawk provides daily IR and SLAR coverage over the division AO. Photo missions are flown almost daily. Coordination of information obtained from IR and photo provide the division with timely indications of enemy activity. IR provides intelligence [REDACTED] Photos provide time sequence coverage of areas in AO. No other collection means has this capability.

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MG Ware: General comment that SLAR provides info [redacted] not available from Air Force since USAF does not have [redacted] Photos can be obtained much more rapidly by OV-1s (4-48 hours) as compared to USAF which takes 10-15 days. Division IR responsiveness is better than USAF because of shorter request channel.

MG Stone: All info provided by Mohawk subsystems is obtainable by other means (USAF); however, the percentage of completions and overall responsiveness of the Mohawk unit (225th SAC) is higher. Although USAF possesses IR capability, Mohawk much more responsive to the division's needs. By use of GSTs (no USAF capability), if targets are determined to be suspected or known enemy locations they are targeted by artillery for immediate fire. Rather than receiving info 6 hours old, data is received in minutes. In this way division elements can bring immediate fire upon the enemy.

MG Ewell: The OV-1 has provided, on a daily basis, [redacted] which is not obtainable by other means. This is in reference to SLAR and IR readouts in response to mission requests.

MG Williamson: See answers to questions 1 and 2.

MG Getty: Mohawks provide IR and SLAR in-flight reports which are not available from other sources. This information is of great value because it enables rapid response to acquired targets. On several occasions, SLAR Mohawks have worked in close coordination with FACs and ground commanders to provide targets for air strikes. IR detections are relayed to unit responsible for area in which emissions are received. These acquired targets are immediately engaged by artillery and, in some instances, are followed up by ground operations.

MG Zais: SLAR permits the division to maintain intermittent night surveillance of areas which would not otherwise be covered. [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

4. QUESTION: (w) (e) HAVE YOU EVER DESIGNED ANY PARTICULAR TACTICS AROUND THE OV-1? (EXAMPLE: HUNTER/KILLER TEAM.)

LTC Peers: No special tactics. Size of CTZ and availability of aircraft require detailed employment planning.

LTC Kerwin: Firefly missions are flown nightly with SLAR. Very effective for sampam interdiction. SLAR has also been used with TAC Air. This mission, when run, is successful.

MG Eckhardt: VR and flare ships support project "Blackhawk" and project "Nighthawk." This is coordinated use of OV-1 aircraft and gunships to intercept border infiltration. SLAR missions are flown nightly in support of Firefly operations for Can Tho, Soc Trang, and Vinh Long airfields. All SLAR and IR in-flights are passed for immediate artillery engagement.

BG Schweiter: Not at Corps level.

MG Forsythe: Evidence of enemy activity is relayed from Mohawks to Lightningbug Teams for engagement. Also quick reaction artillery fires are placed on enemy positions located by IR sensors.

MG Ware: Division is studying techniques of supporting SLAR missions with Firefly team on ground alert. Resources (Fire teams) limits this operation. Division also studying use of IR to evaluate selected SLAR returns. (Multi-sensor missions.)

MG Stone: Division uses GSTs to obtain targets for artillery engagement.

MG Ewell: No particular tactics have been designed around the OV-1 except routine artillery engagement of in-flight SLAR and IR targets when proper clearance can be obtained.

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MG Williamson: Hunter/Killer of Mohawk search followed by Firefly appears to have application worthy of experiment.

MG Getty: Routinely airstrikes, artillery, and in some cases, ground operations are employed against targets acquired by SLAR and IR.

MG Zais: Since division has no Mohawks and there is no timely source of Mohawk support, no particular tactics have been designed around it.

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5. QUESTION: (u) ~~(e)~~ HAS THE MOHAWK SYSTEM BEEN MORE/LESS RESPONSIVE TO YOUR REQUIREMENTS FOR PHOTOGRAPHY OR IR THAN THE AIR FORCE?

LTG Peers: Mohawk more responsive than AF for photo and IR. Limited photo capability requires dependency on the Air Force.

LTG Kerwin: OV-1 is more responsive than Air Force within its camera capability. [REDACTED] Air Force delivery system is slower. OV-1 can provide immediate response while on VR missions for photos. OV-1 provides bulk of preplanned IR missions over Air Force.

MG Eckhardt: Under the MACV priority system, we do not enjoy as high a priority as other CTZs. Even though USAF sensor systems provide high quality large area coverage, they cannot often be obtained due to requirements elsewhere. The Mohawks of the 244th SAC are in direct support of the Corps and are thus more responsive to urgent requirements than other aerial reconnaissance available. The close proximity of the aircraft and the close working relationship, make the Mohawk system more responsive than the Air Force to immediate requirements.

EG Schweiter: Mohawk system is much more responsive to tactical units than the Air Force. The USAF and III MAF will respond immediately only on high priority, emergency type missions. The OV-1 unit (245th AS Co.) in support of I CTZ responds less rapidly than a division ASTA Platoon because more justification is required to divert aircraft from other missions.

MG Forsythe: Photo capability of ASTA provides the commander with instantaneous reaction. Photos can be obtained from Air Force but require much longer notification and have built in processing delays.

MG Ware: Mohawk systems have been much more responsive than USAF. Request channel severely limits responsiveness.

SUSC 32 (M) (1)

MG Stone:

Mohawk systems have been more responsive to division requirements than USAF system. Mohawks are controlled at I FFV, thus requests can be made and accomplished more simply and rapidly than with the Air Force which centrally controls all aircraft at Saigon.

COMPARISONS (Percent completions)

| | <u>IR</u> | <u>PHOTO</u> |
|--------|-----------|--------------|
| Mohawk | 81.1% | 76.9% |
| USAF | 20.0% | 50.0% |

MG Ewell:

The Mohawk system has been much more responsive to our requirements for IR than the Air Force and has been approximately equal as regards our photo requirements.

MG Williamson:

Responsiveness is a sore point. Neither the Air Force nor Army is responsive to the needs of the division. In last five months responsiveness has been cut from weeks to 26 hours, and at best 11 hours. Response should be 6 hours or less. Average time of request to receipt is: AF - 5 1/2 days; Army - 3 1/2 days; both too long.

MG Getty:

Mohawk has been much more responsive. Photos: Mohawks 1-2 days; USAF - more than two days. IR: 58 out of 65 requests in the last two months were flown by Mohawks. Advantage here is in-flight reports that are received. Division states, however, that quality of USAF photos are superior to that of Mohawks.

MG Zais:

The present system which calls for centralized control of Mohawk assets at III MAF is not sufficiently responsive to satisfy the requirements for tactical intelligence at division level. The division must react quickly to confirm or deny suspected targets uncovered by its collection agencies. The Mohawk is well suited for this purpose. It can be made available to fly in six hours of request time and the results are made available in no more than twelve hours.

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6. QUESTION: ^(u)_(c) WOULD THE LOSS OF YOUR ASTA PLATOON SIGNIFICANTLY EFFECT THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY OF YOUR COMMAND? HOW?

LTC Peers: N/A.

LTC Kerwin: N/A.

MG Eckhardt: N/A.

BG Schweiter: Assignment of ASTA Platoons to the divisions or a company to this Corps would enhance the intelligence capability. Immediate reaction to command desires for pinpoint photo IR and SLAR coverage is not provided by any other system. Immediate response would allow exploitation of short breaks in inclement weather not possible with other time consuming request/targeting systems.

MG Forsythe: Although the ASTA Platoon is limited by overaged and marginally effective sensors, its loss would adversely affect the intelligence acquisition and collection capability. The capability must be organic to the division.

MG Ware: Loss of ASTA Platoon would significantly affect intelligence capability, particularly for photo. USAF SLAR and IR could be obtained but the information would be of little value by the time it was received.

MG Stone: The present system of utilizing the Mohawk Company at Corps level negates the timeliness required of Aerial Surveillance in this type of conflict since readout are for approximately 12-24 hours after TOT and prints are not received for approximately 3-7 days. The loss of precious reaction time would be reversed with the presence of organic aircraft and pilots. The division, the unit that reacts to the information produced, would be the first to receive the intelligence. This would enable the MI officers at division to debrief the crew to obtain further information acquired by visual reconnaissance.

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MG Ewell:

The assignment of an ASTA Platoon would probably assist but not materially enhance the intelligence collection capability of this command. The Mohawk system is not designed to detect personnel whereas, in delta operations, with enemy travel restricted to foot or small sampam, we must target on units in company size or smaller.

MG Williamson:

ASTA would significantly enhance the capability of the division, if maintenance personnel were available. If not ASTA, direct support. Drawback to DS is no film development capability.

MG Getty:

An assigned ASTA Platoon would probably be more responsive to division requirements. However, the maintenance requirement for support of the aircraft and sensors at division level must be considered. Our lack of experience precludes a definitive answer on this question; however, the assignment of an Aerial Surveillance Company at Corps level appears to be the better solution.

MG Zais:

The addition of an ASTA would definitely enhance the division's intelligence gathering capability. The next best solution would be to assign a Mohawk company to XXIV Corps and place its assets in general support of the division.

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7. QUESTION: ^(u) ~~(e)~~ DOES YOUR DIVISION EMPLOY THE GROUND SENSOR TERMINAL (GST) SYSTEM WITH THE MOHAWK? IS IT EFFECTIVE?

LTG Peers: Both IR and SLAR employed. Both effective for artillery missions.

LTG Kerwin: No GSTs within III CTZ.

MG Eckhardt: Yes, and it is effective. By centralization of both IR and SLAR GSTs at the AS Company, the operators can perform a quick analysis of the system and then relay the information back to the OV-1 TOC for relay to Sector.

BG Schweiter: 101st Division uses SLAR GST which is deadlined 50% of the time. IR GST has not been dependable because of maintenance and has not been used.

MG Forsythe: Presently, the division does not have GSTs, but there are two on requisition.

MG Ware: 1st Infantry Division does not have GSTs. Division feels that use of SLAR and IR GSTs would markedly enhance timely responsiveness.

MG Stone: GSTs have been in operation ten months. Real time targets are acquired after analysis, they are targeted by artillery for immediate fire. Rather than receiving information 6 hours old, data is received in minutes. IR GST is more beneficial than SLAR.

MG Ewell: This organization does not have the GST system utilized with the Mohawk.

MG Williamson: 25th Division does not have GSTs.

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MG Getty:

Division employs one SLAR GST. It is effective in that it enhances our capability to react rapidly to information which cannot be detected in flight. IR has not been used because of radio range and lack of a capability to develop imagery.

MG Zais:

Yes, SLAR sensor is employed at Camp Eagle and is effective when operational; however, it is operational only about 50% of the time due to equipment failure.

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(u)
8. QUESTION: (G) IS THE MOHAWK "PAYING ITS WAY"? IF NOT, IS THE FAULT ASSOCIATED WITH THE SENSORS, ENVIRONMENT, ORGANIZATION, OR PROCEDURES? HOW CAN WE MAKE IT PROFITABLE?

LTG Peers: Mohawk is paying its way. Becomes more valuable when evaluated as one part of an overall information collection system. Down time and parts are a serious problem.

LTG Kerwin: Mohawk is paying its way with photo capability alone. Although IR and SLAR are less effective, they provide information not provided by any other means. GSTs will improve the effectiveness of IR and SLAR.

MG Eckhardt: The Mohawk is making a positive contribution to the intelligence system in the Delta. The term "pay way" is misleading and is beyond the purview of this headquarters to answer. One cannot put a price on intelligence.

BG Schweiter: The OV-1 is definitely paying its way. It has the only effective SLAR system in Vietnam. Responsiveness of the OV-1s to command requirements cannot be replaced by any other systems now available.

MG Forsythe: Understandably, no dollar value can be assigned to the intelligence information the Mohawk provides this division. The principle area for improvement is in the sensors. The follow-on SEAMORE sensors should provide acceptable capability.

MG Ware: SLAR could pay its way, if used with a minimum of two fire teams. Improved IR system is required to permit their use above 2000 feet and out of range of ground fire.

MG Stone: The Mohawk system, as utilized in the Central Highlands, is definitely paying its way. This, however, is not a blanket endorsement of the entire system. The photographic coverage is limited and film processing is inferior. SLAR readouts have proven less than adequate. A more profitable utilization would be made, if ASTA Platoon were assigned.

MG Ewell: Realistically, the Mohawk system is not "paying its way" in our TAOI.

MG Williamson: Mohawk is an important and valuable asset in the intelligence officers inventory. Centralization prevents responsiveness to 25th Division requirements. SLAR and IR effectiveness will be alleviated with GSTs.

MG Getty: At present time there is no way of determining the real payoff of the Mohawk system. The Mohawk does provide useful and timely information on a regular basis. While the SLAR and IR are paying their way, the photo subsystem has not been effective.

MG Zais: The Mohawk is not paying its way in this division due to the reasons listed above. It could be remedied with an ASTA or the next best would be a DS support role and the third and least desirable would be to furnishh a specified number of sorties per day.

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(u)
9. QUESTION: ~~(c)~~ WHAT ARE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ORGANIZING AND DEPLOYING A FOLLOW-ON SYSTEM?

LTG Peers: Organization and deployment of follow-on system require no change from the present, except the palletized package should allow some reduction in required number of aircraft. Other improvements should consider

[REDACTED]

LTG Kerwin: Deployment of OV-1Ds should follow present deployment concept. Sensors should be tailored to terrain.

[REDACTED]

MG Eckhardt: Recommend that improved sensor system of the SEAMORE type be provided for each of the 18 aircraft of the 244th Co. Aircraft should be centrally located at Can Tho in the Corps general support role. Centralized control has many advantages, flexible response, more efficient maintenance and more protection against sabotage.

BG Schweiter: Recommend follow-on be organized as companies deployed under OPCON of Corps/Field Forces. Advantages of this over ASTA Platoon concept is: (1) More economical utilization of crews, aircraft, II personnel, maintenance and equipment. (2) SLAR can cover area more effectively. (3) Corps headquarters is close enough to division to respond and allocate sorties.

MG Forsythe: The 1st Cav now employs a degree of mobility and flexibility not found in any other Army organization. The organizational structure and procedures are adequate with minor modifications.

MG Ware: Improved systems, SLAR and IR, would be invaluable for use in general intelligence gathering effort and as hunter in Hunter/Killer operations. GSTs are also required.

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- MG Stone: Improved sensors and palletized packages will further improve the capabilities of Mohawk aircraft; however, the most advantageous improvement to the current system would be to deploy an ASTA Platoon directly to the division.
- MG Ewell: Without knowing the trade-off value associated with the Mohawk system it is difficult to assess the value of this reconnaissance/surveillance system when the Mohawk is compared with the Air Cavalry and O-1G light fixed wing aircraft presently under division control.
- MG Williamson: Improved sensors will be invaluable to the division intelligence effort, if immediately responsive. GSTs would be located in division production center.
- MG Getty: A follow-on system should be consolidated in AS Companies at Corps level. Reasons are: (1) To provide necessary maintenance for this sophisticated system. (2) Fewer highly trained specialists required to service the aircraft. (3) To provide greater flexibility in accomplishing requested missions and scheduling maintenance, etc.
- MG Zais: Because of this headquarters lack of experience with the Mohawk, recommendations for follow-on cannot be made.

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