

Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems during the Korea Conflict

[Note: This manuscript was prepared by the Military History Section of Headquarters, United States Army Forces and Eighth Army at the end of the Korean War. It was subsequently deposited at the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH; now US Army Center of Military History) for reference use by historians preparing the official history of the Army. It is typical of the kinds of detailed studies routinely carried out by the experienced combat historians during the Korean War. The original is on file in the Historical Manuscripts Collection (HMC) under file number 8-5.1A AA.G, which should be cited in footnotes, along with the title. It is reproduced here with only those limited modifications required to adapt to the World Wide Web; spelling, punctuation, and slang usage have not been altered from the original. Where modern explanatory notes were required, they have been inserted as italicized text in square brackets. This item originally carried a SECRET security classification, but is now unclassified; all references to that past classification have been omitted.]

MONOGRAPHS

Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems during the Korea Conflict

Background

OCMH assigned to the Military History Section, GHQ FEC by letter dated 3 Aug 51, responsibility for preparation, of a draft monograph on "Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems and Their Solutions," for Volume III, Part 2, of the official History of the Korean Conflict. The letter implemented instructions contained in DA letter AGAO-CS 314.7 (3 Aug 51) HIS, 9 Aug 51, sub: "Far East Command Historical Activities." G2, GHQ FEC began preparation of the monograph in accordance with a verbal agreement between Brig Gen R. F. Ennis, G-2, and Col Allison R. Hartman, Chief, MHS, in Nov 51. Research and work continued by G2 Headquarters FEC and G2 AFFE (Adv) until suspended by Col Myrick, Deputy G2 AFFE (Adv) in Jun 53 on account of personnel shortages. Per verbal agreement between Col Myrick and Col Preston J. C. Murphy, Chief, MHS, Headquarters AFFE, on 3 Sep 53 and DF dated 5 Sep 53, G2 was to incorporate in the monograph materials to discharge the requirement placed on CG AFFE by DA letter AGAO-CS 314.7 (20 Aug 53) HIS, 27 Aug 53, sub: "Historical Program, USAFFE," to cover exploitation of captured enemy personnel and documents.

After collection of pertinent information, G2 AFFE resumed work on the monograph in Apr 54. The draft monograph was completed in Jan 55. Upon review, the Chief, Military History Section, determined that the monograph was not a historical study. It has been held pending a decision of the Chief or Military History Officer as to disposition.

Review Comments

MH has two clean drafts of the monograph. Consisting of 55 pages of text, without footnotes or documentation, it is a paper or study of various intelligence and counterintelligence problems encountered in the Far East during the period of the Korean conflict. It is a general study of the problems encountered, five chapters devoted to collection problems, intelligence production, communications, intelligence problems, and counterintelligence on both the Eighth Army—communications zone level and theater level. A final chapter contains conclusions and recommendations. Problems are discussed but few historical examples are cited. Rather than a historical study, it is an essay in intelligence problems with no references to supporting documents or source materials.

Recommendation

That in accordance with the request of Lt Col Rockis, OCMH, and the draft monograph is forwarded to OCMH as a working paper only for whatever value it may be to writers of that office.

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS DURING THE KOREAN CONFLICT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
<u>PREFACE</u>	4-i
<u>I ARMY COLLECTION PROBLEMS</u>	5
Linguists	5
Order of Battle	5
Photo Interpreters	6
Personnel Replacements for MIS Battalion	7
Ground Liaison Team Personnel	7
Assignment of EEI and Establishment of Priorities	8
Captured and Recovered Personnel and Refugees	8
Captured and Confiscated Documents	10
Enemy Material	11
Photo Reconnaissance	13
Terrain Intelligence and Mapping	15
<u>II ARMY-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION</u>	16
Order of Battle	16
Personalities	16
Evaluation of Covert Intelligence Reports	17
<u>III ARMY-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS</u>	18
Communications	18
Reports and Distribution	18
<u>IV COMMUNICATIONS ZONE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS</u>	20
Military Intelligence Specialist Personnel	20
Collection Problems	21
Intelligence Production	22
Co-ordination and Liaison	22
<u>V THEATER-LEVEL COLLECTION PROBLEMS</u>	24
Military Intelligence and Specialist Personnel	24
POW Interrogations	27
Captured and Confiscated Documents	33
<u>VI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE</u>	36
Clearances	36
Personnel Procurement and Rotation for CIC Detachments in Korea	38
Captured American Personnel	39
Korean Terrain Helpful to Enemy Agents	40
Threat of Sabotage During Hostilities in Korea	41
North Korean and Other Espionage Agents in Japan	42
<u>VII CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</u>	45

PREFACE

This Monograph on Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence problems during the Korean operation is a compilation of the difficulties and problems arising incident to that conflict. These problems are considered only in their relationship to the active area of hostilities and the development of intelligence information of immediate concern to the Commander in the field. That discussion relating to the field of personnel, procedural systems, and collection problems is brought out in detail because it is felt that these matters have a direct influence on the lessons learned and will offer a solution to similar problems in similar situations.

No attempt has been made in this document to cover the myriad facets pertaining to the production neither of strategic intelligence nor of the relationship of the theater Army Intelligence effort with that of the other services. However, the reader should remember that these difficulties arose while this section was G2 GHQ Far East Command and were applicable in part or in whole to those other services.

Conclusions and recommendations are contained in the last chapter of this document. Individual studies peculiar to a given situation may be found in existing accession lists or intelligence libraries of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

CHAPTER I
ARMY COLLECTION PROBLEMS
LINGUISTS

During the early phases of the Korean Operations, the language barrier between US and ROK units caused long delays in reporting important intelligence information at all echelons of command. The Korean language lacks many modern words and unitary forms which caused many cases of mistranslation. The insufficient number of qualified linguists to carry on the necessary communications at the higher levels of command was critical.

It was recommended that additional linguists be trained for the Korean operations in both the Korean and Chinese languages. It was necessary in many cases to use Nisei personnel as liaison agents with Korean units, employing Japanese as the common language. In many Korean units, the ROK furnished English-speaking personnel as interpreters for US officers. In the fall of 1951 each Korean Army Technical School was compiling a dictionary of its own to be submitted to a central agency which would in turn publish a complete technical dictionary.

This solution was not completely satisfactory. Because there remained a critical shortage of qualified linguists, it was a stop-gap measure employed pending the arrival of school-trained linguists from the CONUS. Upon arrival of trained linguists this situation improved greatly.

The solution was sound as far as it went, but the limitations in number and ability of the ZI-trained linguists (particularly Caucasian personnel) meant that they could never satisfy a problem wherein so many units and activities were concerned. The situation was further aggravated by the rotation problem. Lacking greatly in military terminology and Asiatic background, Caucasian graduates of the Army Language School generally were not "qualified" linguists in the full sense of the word, but had merely a good foundation knowledge upon which to build.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Thorough screening should be exercised in the selection of Order of Battle personnel both before and after training in the specialized type of work. These personnel must be able and willing to devote a great amount of time to research and be capable of discerning significant items in a mass of documents. Order of Battle work is confining and often tedious, and involves considerable research which often results in little or no apparent progress. An example of this is the

processing of many reports of a conflicting nature with a net result which prohibits accurate analysis. A definite and interesting challenge to a man who is inclined to this type of work, it is often nothing more than a boring job to another individual who is not happy unless the results of his efforts are conclusive or at least relatively tangible.

During the Korean conflict replacements assigned to the Order of Battle Branch, G-2, Eighth Army, although graduated from Intelligence Schools, were at times not fully qualified to take over an assignment because of the unfamiliarity of those replacements with the peculiarities of the situation in Korea. When officer personnel reported to the Eighth Army G-2 Order of Battle Branch, they were given an orientation tour to acquaint them with the over-all functioning of the G-2 Section and were then assigned to understudy the person whom they were to replace. Enlisted personnel were utilized immediately on filing and extracting procedures to familiarize them with Order of Battle procedures.

PHOTO INTERPRETERS

PROBLEM

Throughout the Korean activities the largest problem encountered by PI units was that of many new replacements not being sufficiently trained to interpret Korean photography. The Korean campaign provided an unusual proving ground for Photo Intelligence; it required familiarity with certain factors that were peculiar to the area and their effect on photo interpretation.

The static ground situation limited and reduced many other sources of information, with the result that photo reconnaissance became a major source of intelligence. Accurate and complete photo reports over a long period of time provided commanders at all levels with dependable intelligence. Air superiority enabled air photographers to cover almost any area desired. However, this superiority, plus the static ground situation, created difficulties for the photo interpreter. The enemy utilized camouflage and concealment to a maximum degree, and constantly improved his technique until the photo interpreter relied on related indications, assumptions, and knowledge of tactical disposition in order to locate enemy installations. It was necessary for him to be familiar with civilian activities in order to be able to detect any deviation indicating military activity.

Approximately two to three months were needed to train a replacement to the degree that he was a competent photo interpreter. The great manpower turnover

caused by rotation was a further complication. Inasmuch as during the years 1952-53 the workload on PI units was extremely heavy, the training of replacements was an undesirable additional burden.

PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS FOR MIS BATTALION

The 502d Military Intelligence Service Battalion received numerous inadequately-trained and unqualified enlisted personnel. These enlisted men were often channeled through Eighth Army Headquarters solely because of their knowledge of some oriental language. While extremely beneficial, fluency in an oriental language does not in itself qualify enlisted personnel for assignment to an intelligence unit. Qualification obstacles most frequently encountered in these enlisted men were the security clearance requirements; lack of non-US citizenship; inadequate mastery of the English language; and lack of interpreter and/or interrogation experience.

Approximately eighty percent of the linguists assigned to Eighth Army were draftees serving under the present draft law requiring two years duty. The average time to serve in Korea after graduating from school was 91 months. This usable portion was further reduced when clearance procedures were not instituted prior to the assignment of the individual to Korea. The average foreign language-speaking civilian, upon reporting for military service, has little or no knowledge of military intelligence or of military terminology. This adds an additional obstacle for the prospective linguist to overcome. In selecting students for language courses, this obstacle can be partly overcome by encouraging persons with previous military service and a language aptitude to become linguists.

GROUND LIAISON TEAM PERSONNEL

The problem of insufficient Ground Liaison Team personnel, insufficient in both number and training, lasted throughout the period of hostilities. Since the T/O authorized only four officers and one enlisted man, it was necessary to double on duties, which caused both officers and enlisted personnel to work longer hours on a seven-day week basis than can be maintained efficiently over extended periods.

Officers were assigned to each echelon within the Tactical Air Group and Wing. This permitted the Ground Liaison Officers to become thoroughly acquainted with their own organization, the qualifications and limitations of pilots and aircraft, and operational procedures. Briefings and other miscellaneous duties were prorated among all Ground Liaison Officers. It was also necessary for the Group

GLO to work with the Night Reconnaissance Squadron, inasmuch as no liaison officer was provided this squadron. An additional enlisted man was borrowed to provide two administrative shifts to operate the Ground Liaison Office.

Experience proved that Army Ground Liaison Officers should be with each echelon of the Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, from Wing Headquarters to one per reconnaissance squadron. Adequate enlisted assistance should be provided. Few officers assigned to this type duty were qualified. It is felt that they should be on flying statue so that they can understand intimately the limitations and capabilities of the aircraft with which the unit to which they are attached is equipped.

ASSIGNMENT OF EEI AND ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIORITIES

In the G-2 Section Eighth Army, it was found that an excessive number of Specific Requests for Information were received from various echelons. Since extensive EEI had already been established, these SRIs in many cases caused a duplication of effort, harassment of the collection agencies, and a delay in obtaining the information desired.

The Chief, Plans and Collection Branch, G-2 Eighth Army was made SRI coordinator. A format was devised which contained the information desired. In addition, a master control chart was prepared upon which this information was placed. This enabled the coordinator to determine readily the status of any or all outstanding SRIs and also those completed or cancelled.

The solution allowed the G-2 Section, Eighth Army to have effective control over SRIs placed upon this headquarters, and also those placed upon the collection agencies available to this headquarters.

CAPTURED AND RECOVERED PERSONNEL AND REFUGEES

Prisoners of War are by far the best source of intelligence information. Throughout the Korean operation, instances have occurred where prisoners of war, attempting to desert or surrender, have been shot by friendly forces because of nervousness or other factors.

During the Korean operation it was often difficult to identify a prisoner of war after capture either by his unit identification or name. This was caused by capturing more than one POW from the same unit or bearing the same name. During his evacuation through channels, more than one numbering system was used; hence a POW would be referred to by several different numerical

designations. To identify the POW concerned often required a great deal of explanation.

To correct this problem Army would assign blocks of numbers to corps, who in turn would assign blocks to its subordinate units. The capturing unit could then assign one of these numbers to the POW it had captured, and by this system a POW would be identified by one number from the time of his capture until release from Army control.

Since medical intelligence is primarily strategic in nature, medical interrogations were not conducted at levels below corps. Except for a few prisoners interrogated by the Corps Preventive Medicine Officer, all medical interrogations were conducted by the Medical Intelligence Officer at Army level.

During hostilities, prisoners of war with information of a tactical value were often captured by agencies who failed to report those POWs to Eighth Army for long periods of time. At times, POWs were not placed in proper channels for immediate evacuation, which resulted in a loss of time in obtaining and disseminating valuable intelligence information.

In a comparison of accuracy of information obtained at Division, Corps, and Army levels, the Army-level interrogations were found to be much more reliable. This was not caused by inefficiency on the parts of Division and Corps interrogation teams, but rather was the result of fear and time. Communist soldiers were told to fight to "death"; therefore, no instructions were given to them as to what to say if captured. They had been told that if captured they would be subjected to torture and/or bacteriological experiments and then be put to death. Therefore, when a Chinese or North Korean soldier was captured, he was afraid of what was going to happen to him and, as a result, lied or bluffed to stall for time. Division interrogators in their limited time could only partially break this fear. At Corps level the POW, beginning to have hope, told fewer lies and conflicting stories. Before Corps interrogators could verify and re-interrogate, their allotted time limit was up. By the time the POW reached the Army enclosure he had lost much of his fear and, as a result, was usually very willing to talk.

When questioning either Chinese or North Korean POWs, interrogators had to be very careful about the use of leading questions. If a POW had an idea of what information was desired, he would lie most obligingly. When this happened, the POW told a different story each day until the result of the interrogation was a mess of jumbled statements, none of which were accurate. Difficulty was also experienced in causing the POW to respond in accordance with the line of

questioning because of their tendency to dissertate at great length upon irrelevant details of their life which had no military connection.

CAPTURED AND CONFISCATED DOCUMENTS

During the Korean operations, documents were generally handled in accordance with FM 30-15 and FM 30-5. US Divisions, as a rule, appeared to be conscious of the value of captured documents, although individuals, through ignorance or the desire to retain souvenirs, removed valuable documents from intelligence channels in some instances. Other incidents involved stapling or pasting item slips to the documents or in other ways marring the document, and occasionally forwarding "C" value documents without a batch slip or means of indicating circumstances of capture. The value of a document is necessarily impaired if higher echelons are unable to determine the circumstances of capture.

ROKA Divisions and Corps, lacking training in the handling of documents, frequently engaged in practices detrimental to the intelligence effort. In one instance a battalion commander, receiving a captured document he believed to be of immediate or potential value to him, retained the document for reference, taking the document out of channels until its value was considerably reduced. ROKA commanders receiving a document they felt was of more value to ROKA G-2 (documents with a political tone) than to Eighth Army G-2 frequently forwarded such documents to ROKA G-2 directly. Usually these documents would be forwarded eventually to Eighth Army G-2, but at the cost of a reduction in intelligence value.

Because of the difficulties encountered with ROK units, a somewhat cumbersome arrangement was made with the ROKA for the forwarding of all documents. This arrangement functioned successfully in the static situation of the Korean operations, but would have required modification to meet the conditions of a fluid operation.

It was found advantageous to keep records of documents received at Eighth Army Headquarters from each corps and division. Such records are relatively easy to keep and are valuable in:

1. Indicating a comparison of documents received from each unit.
2. Estimating the flow of documents to be expected from a unit as a result of its participation in a given action.
3. Indicating units which are below average or lax in the forwarding of documents.

The solution outlined above proved adequate to meet requirements of static warfare and the current armistice. There are, however, many imponderables involved in planning for a fluid situation. The greatest of these is the extent of development of the ROKA at such time as a mobile combat situation develops. Any plan evolved in the immediate future, therefore, would at best be tentative.

All documents on the front line were collected and given a batch number. These documents were then scanned at a company level if there was a translator present. They were then forwarded through channels and scanned at each echelon for information of immediate value. Documents were translated in their entirety at Eighth Army and the translation distributed to the interested parties. As with the case of POWs, the time required for these documents to reach Army level and be translated often caused them to be of little value for Order of Battle purposes.

When documents were captured, they were reported by spot report in the same manner as reporting POWs. Any identification or portion of interest in the scanned documents would be sent by corps to Eighth Army.

Evidence of enemy units as well as enemy unit identifications, strength, location, movement, mission, or disposition must be timely to be of value. The spot report of important information disclosed by captured documents fulfills this requirement.

ENEMY MATERIAL

In weapons and material of war, it was generally known that the NKA was equipped predominantly with Soviet materiel. This fact remained relatively constant, although other enemy characteristics fluctuated widely. The knowledge that the NKA was equipped with Soviet equipment and weapons of war did not begin to answer the technical intelligence problem which confronted US troops in Korea. Far more pertinent were the questions: were NKA arms and equipment of the most modern type? In what quantity were Soviet arms available? How did these arms match up against American equipment? Too few technical intelligence units were available during the initial operations, and the activities were of such a rapid, moving nature that little enemy equipment fell into friendly hands.

Technical intelligence units of all branches of the Army were dispatched as rapidly as possible from CONUS to the Korean theater. Through the work of these units, it was confirmed that the bulk of the equipment in the hands of the enemy, particularly artillery and other heavy material, came from Soviet surplus stock and

was not of the most recent design. Following the UNC autumn counter-offensive in 1950, the thoroughly routed NKA lost or abandoned almost all of its heavy equipment, particularly its artillery weapons. In evaluating the enemy's weapons and materials and comparing them to weapons and equipment of the Soviet Army, it was readily confirmed that the NKA was predominantly an obsolescent equipped army. One interesting element of the status of NKA equipment received from USSR was that many POWs reported that a large portion of the materiel was composed of old models but of recent manufacture.

Through the proper hurdling of exam materiel captured by UNC forces, four major objectives were achieved:

1. Effective counter weapons and counter tactics were promptly developed.
2. New ideas were promptly exploited for our own benefit.
3. Early deductions were made as to the state of enemy resources for war.
4. Usable enemy supplies were used to augment our own supplies.

Though it was proved that the materiel in the hands of the NKA during the early phases of hostilities was of antiquated Soviet pattern, the effectiveness of other forms of enemy equipment must be judged in the light of what US and ROK forces could put up against the enemy. Unquestionably, the NKA equipment, by and large, was inferior to that of US materiel, but in the initial stages of the operations the NKA was capable of bringing massive superiority in both quantity of area and quantity of manpower to bear against friendly troops. When US forces approached equal size to the NKA, the entire picture of the Korean operations changed, and the UNC was the overwhelmingly more powerful in Korea until the entry of the Chinese Communist Forces into the conflict. This created an entirely new picture.

Technical intelligence agencies were aware that the ROKA was retaining CEM for possible use by either the National Police or the ROK Army. This handling or mishandling of CEM seemed rather unnecessary inasmuch as the ROK Government was being supplied with ample US equipment to maintain both these units. In addition to US equipment, many Japanese items were being reconditioned in Japan under US contract for the ROKA. It was rumored many times that the ROKA was keeping the CEM for future activities, since they felt the UNC would eventually evacuate Korea and leave them on their own.

Indoctrination programs were initiated at all levels to educate all members of the armed forces to do their part in reporting, turning in, and evaluating all items of CEM. Intelligence training for the purpose of indoctrinating the individual soldier

with the importance of active co-operation in handling CEM and stressing the significance of technical intelligence to the success of the over-all military effort was developed.

Technical Intelligence units were activated by the ROKA, and many of these units participated in activities during the closing months of hostilities. Other newly activated units later received training from US technical intelligence detachments in the field. Prior to the Cease Fire, the ROK units in many cases were abiding by prevailing directives regarding the turn-in of CEM more readily than US units. In addition to this, the US technical intelligence units were invited to exploit most of the CEM presently in possession of ROKA at the various depots.

It was recommended to higher headquarters that technical intelligence training be included in all intelligence training programs, both in the CONUS and the overseas theaters. It was further recommended that one man in each unit be designated as the technical intelligence co-coordinator, who would gather up the CEM, tag it, report it to his S-2, and finally see that it was evacuated to the unit's respective salvage collecting point.

The design, manufacture, and employment of materiel by the enemy during the Korean operations have been and are of vital interest to the Eighth Army. To enable the Army to keep abreast of the development and manufacture of the enemy's war potential, a highly specialized organization was placed in the field to collect report on, and evacuate all items of enemy materiel captured on the battlefield. On the whole, a vast amount of intelligence was collected from CEM during the year 1953. Through the analysis of the CEM by various technical agencies, Eighth Army was able to determine the quality of manufacture, capabilities, and limitations of the captured equipment.

PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE

Eighth Army requirements for reconnaissance photography were never fully achieved during the Korean activities. These requirements as stated in negatives per day were based on the quality of photographic detail as provided by 1/5000 scale. If better equipment had been available, which would have produced the same amount of detail from smaller scale coverage, the requirements in negatives per day would in proportion to the decreased scale.

In defensive action 1/5000 scale coverage or the equivalent in detail, of the Army front is required once every three days. This detailed coverage is necessary to expedite identification of types of enemy equipment, signs of troop or other

activity and other factors necessary to basic Army intelligence. Most of the confirmed intelligence data in Korea was obtained by photo interpretation. Cover along an Army front seventy-five miles wide by twenty miles deep, at a scale of 1/5000 and flown once every three days, would require an average of 3,250 negatives per day. The following is a breakdown of required daily photographic coverage:

Army Front coverage, 1500 sq. mi., flown once in 3 days at 1/5000	3,250 negs/day
Deep cover of 10% of enemy rear areas, 600 sq. ml., once in 10 days at 1/5000	380 negs/day
Special cover, various categories, 1/3000	400 negs/day
Night strips, 9"x9" negs., scale 1/5000	100 negs/day
Night mosaics, 9"x9" negs., 1/5000	820 negs/day
Obliques, large scale	50 negs/day
TOTAL FOR DEFENSIVE ACTION IN NEGS/DAY	5,000 negs/day

In offensive action, the need for front-line coverage and deep cover increases slightly over that needed during a defensive or static situation, although the needs for other types of photographic reconnaissance remain relatively the same. However, it is felt that requirements will vary inversely with the increased speed of the advance. The reasons for the difference in needs are as follows:

1. In the initial stages of an attack, front-line cover must be complete and continuous. Care must be taken that the scheme of the attack is not disclosed by selectively photographing only those areas of prime importance. The deep cover taken must include several likely objectives deep in the enemy rear.
2. Once the offensive has successfully begun, the photographic effort must be directed towards securing photographs which can be delivered to the interested units in time to be used. This photography, of necessity, should be of areas far enough in advance of the unit concerned on any given day so that it can be processed, interpreted, annotated, reproduced, and delivered before the unit reaches the area photographed. Requests for photography must be closely coordinated with the G-3 estimate of the rate of advance of the attack. The deep cover taken after the offensive has begun would be used to develop objectives for future airborne, armored, or amphibious operations.

Front line cover of Army front, 1500 sq. mi., scale 1/5000, flown every other day	3,800 negs/day
Deep cover of 10% of enemy rear areas flown once every five days at scale 1/5000	850 negs/day
Special cover, scale 1/3000 flown daily	400 negs/day
Night strips, 9"x9", 1/5000, daily	100 negs/day
Night mosaics, 9"x9", 1/5000, dally	800 negs/day
Obliques, large scale, 1/5000, flown daily	50 negs/day
TOTAL FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION IN NEGATIVES PER DAY	6,000 negs/day

In most cases photographs were taken on a 1/7000 scale inasmuch as to fly 1/5000 scale would nearly double the number of sorties to be flown. Nearly 70% of the photography flown in Korea was at Eighth Army request. The increase in reconnaissance sorties to meet this requirement could not be fully obtained with equipment available in Korea. Also photographs taken at night were needed to include mosaics, in order to confirm suspected areas of enemy activity during darkness; this need was met to a limited extent in the form of night strips. However, present limitations on the number of flash bombs that can be carried on the B-26 aircraft have restricted the extent of night photography.

TERRAIN INTELLIGENCE AND MAPPING

There was a serious lack of knowledge of strike damage assessment on close air support targets, particularly on TADP-controlled drops. Photographic coverage of front-line targets proved largely ineffective for bomb-damage assessment. With the receipt of so little information, the planning and selection phases of the air-ground operations is hindered to a great extent.

CHAPTER II

ARMY-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

ORDER Of BATTLE

During active operations in Korea there were often areas or units in North Korea which were not reported to the Army OB Branch for long periods of time. In order for Eighth Army to maintain a current and accurate record of the enemy situation, definite intelligence information on those areas or units was required.

In order to maintain a complete, current, and accurate description of enemy strength and capabilities, it is necessary that information be obtained at periodic intervals concerning enemy forward, immediate reserve, and rear arena. Information from this arena must be obtained with sufficient frequency to detect movement of enemy troops and to reveal concentrations of supply and support units. The mutual co-operation of collection agencies and Order of Battle personnel on an informal basis should facilitate the maintenance of an accurate portrayal of enemy strength and equipment.

PERSONALITIES

The various forces composing the Eighth Army brought together a heterogeneous collection of languages and customs; many times these factors caused delays in information required by higher headquarters. Failure to report unfavorable information because of face saving and failure to realize the importance of passing on information to higher headquarters were principal difficulties.

Indoctrination and training courses were instituted to imbue the Allies with the importance of submitting timely and accurate information as well as to promote a better understanding among those who comprised the UNC forces. Informal staff visits were made to lower echelons during periods when action was slow in order to learn their problem and to encourage and assist subordinate units. Liaison teams were dispatched to lower echelons during periods of activity to assist in the timely and accurate reporting of information.

Numerous measures have been taken to overcome the language and customs barrier and to promote a better appreciation of timely intelligence on the part of ROK forces; ROK intelligence training was checked and helpful advice and assistance was rendered ROK intelligence personnel. The Eighth Army Weekly Intelligence Summary was translated into the Korean language affecting a better exchange of information between US and ROK forces. ROK G-2 personnel were oriented and briefed on the functions of the various branches of Eighth Army G-2.

Army G-2 rendered valuable assistance to the ROK personnel in establishing the G-2 organizational structure of the ROK Field Army.

EVALUATION OF COVERT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

Covert agents in many cases were unable to penetrate the security screen of the CCF installations during the period 1 November 1952 to 27 July 1953. Causes included racial differences, the language barrier, and tightened security measures. As a result, full information on enemy Order of Battle and of enemy troop movements could not be obtained.

Continuous training of covert agents was emphasized, as well as improvement in operational procedures, reaction of mass-type operations, and a continued careful selection and training of operational-type personnel. During the last phase of operations in Korea, continued emphasis on the production of tactical information of immediate importance was the mission of all covert agencies of the Eighth Army. The effect of centralized control over covert agencies and close coordination and liaison between these agencies and Eighth Army was reflected in the increased volume and worth of intelligence information received. Increased scope of operation continued to build up a clearer picture of the tactical situation confronting UNC forces in Korea.

CHAPTER III
ARMY-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS

Reconnaissance aircraft sightings which promised to affect the ground tactical situation were reported by VHF communications to the Corps G-2. Some difficulty was encountered in maintaining radio contact between the reconnaissance aircraft and the Corps G-2. Corps G-2 Air is normally a considerable distance behind the front lines, usually located at the Corps FSCC or at Corps headquarters. The problem was particularly acute in the mountainous region in the eastern part of the front. The line-of-sight characteristics of VHF radio, as well as the practice of locating Corps FSCCs and headquarters behind large hill masses, contributed substantially to this problem. Antenna remoting equipment has proved inadequate in Korea.

It was recommended that the VHF and UHF radio remoting equipment be improved to overcome the line-of-sight communications limitations caused by the terrain obstacles. The solution is sound, but unless the G-2 Air is at the FSCC and unless the pilot checks in, no amount of VHF or UHF will solve the problem. The most pressing problem between reconnaissance and communications with Corps G-2 Air was that many pilots did not check in with the FSCC when passing over the area.

The Army AGL Communications Center was located approximately five miles from the Air Force Headquarters and constituted a bottleneck in the transmission of immediate requests from the field commanders to the JOC.

REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

The delivery problem is undoubtedly one of the most difficult deficiencies to correct in the over-all PI operations, in that travel time of the photographs from the PI to the requesting unit is too great. All phases of PI have been shortened by finding better methods and newer innovations, but the greatest hindrance to date is still the delivery of photographs to the requesting unit. Photographs flown in the morning may be of value to a requesting unit only until that evening, in which case it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to help the requesting unit. Various circumstances such as weather, transportation, and limited facilities hindered the expedition of the photographs.

During the large-scale attacks in July 1953 and the Army-wide CPX held in December 1953, intelligence production was not delayed by the tendency to

report too many details. PI reports were typewritten, listing each installation discovered on the photo and their co-ordinates with a description and type of activity noted.

An overlay, with a brief written summary of the defensive installations found on each photo mission was substituted for the typewritten report.

CHAPTER IV
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST PERSONNEL

The principal concern of OB operations in KCOMZ was the enemy guerrilla forces which operated-from mountain strongholds within the Communications Zone. Also of concern were enemy forces in the forward areas. KCOMZ was charged with the logistical support of Eighth Army's efforts in the battle zone. The Communications Zone's area of responsibility adjoined the-rear boundary of Eighth Army. Consequently, it was determined that OB data on enemy forces in the battle zone as compiled by Eighth Army would be maintained by KCOMZ. It was recognized early that OB data on each of the above-cited enemy forces must be maintained and correlated with the over-all intelligence operation; e.g., enemy guerrilla activities within the Communications Zone conceivably and frequently were influenced by enemy activities in the battle zone.

Personnel assigned to OB duties were thoroughly trained in the OB aspects of enemy forces within and without the Korean Communications Zone, with special emphasis on the interrelationship of the two as it affected the KCOMZ mission. Subsequently, close supervision was given particularly to that portion of the periodic intelligence reports which outlined guerrilla capabilities to insure proper consideration of these capabilities with respect to enemy operation in the battle zone.

School-trained intelligence personnel further qualified by on-the-job OB training have proved effective in meeting KCOMZ requirements. In a G-2 section of limited size with varied intelligence requirements it is necessary that OB personnel be qualified in other phases of intelligence work.

The over-all logistical mission of KCOMZ did not require a considerable amount of rapid photo interpretation. The need for photo interpreters was therefore too infrequent to justify provisions for PI spaces in the KCOMZ TD. However, it was still necessary to provide for this service when the need arose.

In co-ordination with Eighth Army, a procedure we established wherein aerial photo requests originating in KCOMZ were forwarded to Eighth Army for action. On those occasions when it could be determined that photo interpretation of the prints was advisable, the aerial photo mission was accompanied by a request for an interpretation of the prints. This latter request outlined the specific information which was desired through photo interpretation. The procedure

outlined in this paragraph proved effective. PI requests forwarded by KCOMZ were, without exception, fully processed and expeditiously returned to Eighth Arty.

COLLECTION PROBLEMS

Attendant to the activation of KCOMZ a considerable number of intelligence requirements were imposed by Headquarters AFFE in the form of Essential Elements of Information. It was therefore necessary that KCOMZ not only determine the apportionment of the intelligence requirements upon its collection agencies (subordinate commands and supporting intelligence agencies), but also to establish a priority system on each EEI to emphasize the need for certain types of information over other types.

Collection and confiscation of captured documents were a command responsibility; therefore, appropriate collection procedures were established and promulgated. The preponderance of captured and confiscated documents processed by KCOMZ were of bandit origin; however, POWs were another Source. An SOP was prepared which contained detailed instructions for the collection, handling, and processing of documents.

During a period of over a year, this procedure proved to be a practical and positive measure very adaptable to the KCOMZ intelligence mission. In actual practice, intelligence derived through captured documents was given rapid and complete dissemination.

Concurrent with the activation of KCOMZ a technical intelligence detachment was attached to the Command with the primary mission of examining, processing and disposing of captured and abandoned enemy materiel (CEM). However, this technical intelligence detachment was of insufficient strength to handle physically, in addition to its other responsibilities, the collection of all CEM in the Communications Zone. KCOMZ, in accordance with theater policy, fixed responsibility for prompt report of CEM upon each subordinate command. Reports were forwarded through intelligence channels to the Technical Intelligence Coordinator (TIC) G-2 Section, KCOMZ. The appropriate technical service in KCOMZ was then notified of the location and quantity of CEM by the TIC. The technical intelligence service coordinated with G-4, KCOMZ evacuated the CEM to the designated collecting points.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

Bandit and guerrilla forces normally disposed themselves in approximately thirteen separate areas within the Communications Zone. These forces occupied remote mountain strongholds and/or areas from which they periodically emerged for brief periods to raid, loot, capture, and kill. Identity and strength of their raiding parties was difficult in view of the fact that they generally wore nondescript native garb and utilized hit-and-run tactics. Hence, infiltration into their target areas was relatively simple. During the excitement of the looting and the killing that followed, it was often difficult to differentiate between the raider and his victims. The raiders scattered and deployed from the target area at the conclusion of each mission. Consequently, a rough estimate of the strength and identity of raiding parties was only an approach to accurate assessment. Another complexity was the hesitance of local natives, including victims, to admit knowledge of any information pertaining to the guerrillas and bandits; their fear of reprisal was often greater than their sense of duty.

Close liaison was established with those special security units of the ROK National Police and ROKA who were charged with the responsibility of eliminating bandit and guerrilla forces. The commanders of these security units were advised to stress to their personnel the necessity for capturing prisoners rather than accomplishing one-hundred percent kills as was frequently the case during the earlier stages of anti-guerrilla operations. Subsequent captures conclusively proved to the anti-guerrilla forces the value of information, including OB, which was obtainable from captured personnel. This information, evaluated with intelligence from other sources (e.g., KMAG, CIC), produced reasonably accurate OB data. While not entirely complete, the OB information obtained utilizing the above method was within economy of force limitations, sufficient to meet intelligence requirements.

CO-ORDINATION AND LIAISON

In order for KCOMZ to provide the maximum effective intelligence coverage it was essential that G-2 co-ordination and liaison be established with adjacent as well as subordinate commands. In some cases adjacent commands overlapped geographically with KCOMZ, e.g., KMAG, KCAC, Fifth Air Force, and ROKA. In addition to continued co-ordination with Eighth Army, other agencies frequently coordinated with were the US Embassy, US Army Attaché, CCRAFE, UNCREG, and UNCMAC.

As frequently as feasible the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, KCOMZ or his representative visited the intelligence officers of adjacent commands. The proximity of Headquarters KMAG, Headquarter ROKA, Fifth Air Force Rear, and the US Army Attaché, all located in Taegu, considerably facilitated close liaison. Regional commanders of the 704th CIC Detachment (operationally under G-2, KCOMZ) were directed to effect liaison with various intelligence echelons within the KCOMZ area including OSI, ROK NP, and ROK CIC. Because of frequent efforts to curtail UNC intelligence efforts, and its tendency to guard jealously sovereign privileges, intelligence co-ordination and liaison with ROK agencies was in many cases handicapped. Within security limitations, on-the-spot telephone co-ordination was continually utilized. As appropriate, and particularly in the case of G-2, Eighth Army, pertinent spot and recurring intelligence reports, communicated to higher headquarters were mutually exchanged through information copy distribution on messages, e.g., Daily SITREP and daily reply to special AFFE EEI. Intelligence publications, reports, etc., were exchanged with all interested agencies.

In a relatively small G-2 Section, covering a large geographical area with the intelligence complexities of Korea, it is essential to operate on an SOP basis with a well-organized group of highly qualified officers and enlisted men. Developed methods of co-ordination and liaison proved very adequate but could have been more effective had the G-2 section, KCOMZ been organized under a larger T/D.

CHAPTER V THEATER-LEVEL COLLECTION PROBLEMS

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIALIST PERSONNEL

At the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950, U.S. military Korean linguists were almost nonexistent in the FEC. Against an authorization at that time for 158 Korean linguists, there were fourteen available. Of these fourteen, only seven were sufficiently fluent to be usable in all situations. Korean language requirements prior to June 1950 had been met almost entirely by hire of third-national linguists; the few military linguists were used in situations where, for security reasons the foreign-national linguists were unacceptable.

While the actions listed below were by no means the most desirable solutions, nevertheless they were ones that could be affected with least loss of time and would still permit accomplishment of the assigned intelligence missions. Solutions are shown in order of importance and ultimate value.

1. Use of Japanese as an intermediate language in the interrogation of POWs. As a result of almost forty years of occupation by the Japanese, the majority of Koreans speak Japanese as a second language. This permitted U.S. military Japanese linguists, of whom there was a good supply, to be used to advantage in collection of enemy intelligence. In certain cases where POWs were unwilling or unable to speak Japanese, South Korean nationals and ROKA personnel were used in a three-language interrogation—English to Japanese to Korean. A similar system was used in translation of enemy documents wherein Korean nationals translated documents into Japanese which could then be put into English by U.S. military linguists.
2. Employment of English-speaking Korean nationals secured through cooperation of Korean Mission in Tokyo and local hire of qualified Koreans by Eighth Army.
3. Establishment by AFFE Intelligence School of Korean Language Conversation Course. This course was designed to produce Korean linguists capable of performing Army-level interrogations from strong Japanese military linguists over a six-month period. Course was begun on 1 December 1952, with new classes monthly thereafter.
4. Request to Department of the Army for immediate airlift of thirty Korean linguists to FEC.
5. Request to Department of the Army for expansion of Korean-language classes at Army Language School.

The use of Japanese-speaking U.S. military linguists was the most effective of all solutions in the over-all effort to make up for the almost complete lack of Korean military linguists. In fact, the scarcity of these specialists made necessary the continued use of this method in varying degrees until hostilities ceased in July 1953. However, the use of three languages, Korean, Japanese, and English, in interrogation or translation had definite drawbacks. The most serious of these were: (a) inevitable loss of accuracy which would result from double transposition (Korean to Japanese and Japanese to English and vice versa) and (b) the additional time required for this round-about process.

Use of English-speaking Korean nationals procured in Japan and Korea proved almost as successful as the above method. Supervised by a few military intelligence specialists (both linguist and non-linguist), this group performed outstanding work in interrogation and translation fields. Disadvantages were the comparative scarcity of bilingual Korean nationals and also the security risk involved in the use of such personnel. However, the need outweighed possible breach of security, and this group was used to good advantage throughout the Korean conflict on a calculated-risk basis.

Continuing shortages of military linguists in FEC made it imperative that steps be taken to supplement by local training the meager flow of these specialists from ZI. In December 1952, AFFE Intelligence School inaugurated language conversation courses from Japanese to Korean and from Cantonese dialect to Mandarin dialect Chinese. Students were selected both from pipeline and from units in FEC.

Prerequisites were:

1. Fluency in Japanese or Cantonese and English.
2. Ability to read Japanese or Chinese and English.
3. GCT of 100 or higher.
4. Twelve months retainability in FEC. New classes in each language were begun each month, and by 1 December 1953 approximately 120 linguists had been graduated—equally divided between Korean and Mandarin Chinese. Although the goal of the school was to train linguists capable of Army-level interrogation, in numerous instances graduates have been sufficiently fluent to be used as interpreters by various components of UNC Military Armistice Commission.

Unquestionably, intelligence operations in FEC were hampered by the acute and persistent shortage of trained, experienced military linguists. Under pressure of combat requirements, every effort was made to solve the linguist problem in FEC.

While this effort has guaranteed the timely exploitation of invaluable intelligence information, it has been characterized to a great extent by resort to improvisations and temporary expedients. For example, the large-scale use of non-military, foreign nationals is at best merely a stopgap; at worst, a serious security risk. In the final analysis, the Oriental linguist problem cannot be solved permanently until provisions have been made for maintenance of an adequate pool of U.S. military linguists, provided through normal training channels.

GHQ, FEC had anticipated the possible intervention by the CCF, and in November 1950, G1 FEC was asked by G2 to requisition from Department of the Army thirty Mandarin Chinese linguists against possible future need. As of December 1950, only nine had been received from ZI, none of whom were considered qualified. By June 1951, seventy-five potential Mandarin Chinese linguists had arrived from ZI, of whom only sixteen were capable of performing language duties. An attempt to procure Japanese national Chinese linguists in November 1950 was unsuccessful.

Since the procurement of Mandarin linguists from local sources and from the ZI had proved unsuccessful and unsatisfactory, recruiting of qualified linguists from Formosa remained as the only practicable solution. By March 1951, seventy-five fluent Mandarin Chinese linguists had been received from Taipei and had been passed on to UNC units. Since that time additional Nationalist Chinese have been obtained from Formosa by UNC for linguist assignments with such organizations as Psychological Warfare, CI&E, and ASA.

Of the two conversation courses begun at AFFE Intelligence School in December 1952, the Chinese conversion course from Cantonese to Mandarin dialect was the more successful. Its graduates played a large part in alleviating the chronic shortage of Mandarin Chinese linguists in the theater. The number of usable linguists produced by this training has exceeded the number of usable military Chinese linguists received from ZI since August 1950.

The Far East Command Intelligence School (later to become United States Army Forces Far East Intelligence School) was activated in November 1951. The first classes produced much needed Order of Battle and Photo Interpreter Specialists for use by Eighth Army.

Since that time AFFE Intelligence School has graduated, depending upon the need and the supply obtainable from CONUS, both officer and enlisted intelligence personnel, not only for Army units, but for Navy, Marines, and Air Force as well. On 2 December 1951 MISG/FE (later 500th MI Svc Group), as an operating agency

of G2, GHQ, FEC, was made responsible for the supervision and control of military intelligence specialists in FEC.

The solution provided by the establishment of the AFFE Intelligence School has been eminently successful in supplying intelligence specialists to the command when such specialists have been unobtainable from the United States. The program of the School has been kept sufficiently flexible so that its output could be increased or decreased to meet changing requirements of units in the theater. The designation of a single agency of G2, responsible for proper utilization and assignment of intelligence specialists, has reduced to a minimum the mal-assignment and pipeline losses of these personnel scheduled for assignment in the Far East Command.

POW INTERROGATIONS

Although many enemy soldiers infiltrated our lines as refugees in the early stages of the war, those who were picked up for interrogation did not present too much of a problem as to identification. They apparently had not been instructed on methods of resisting interrogation or the safeguarding of military information and, consequently, co-operated with the interrogator. Early reports on file at 500th MI Service Group indicate that the POWs gave unit identification and any other information they might have had quite willingly. However, when ADVATIS switched to strategic interrogation on 28 October 1950 and the tempo of the attack was stepped up to the point where the number of POWs was multiplied by thousands, the entire system of handling POWs fell apart. Approximately two per cent only of the POWs arriving at Pusan were properly tagged. Some even did not halt at the forward POWEs but were moved directly to Pusan by LST. With the POWs not being tagged prior to arrival at the ComZone POWE, it was impossible to check back in an attempt to identify them. This condition of not being able to identify or even locate a POW who was desired for further interrogation lasted to the time of the repatriation program in 1953.

The lack of identification of POWs resulted in the following:

1. Inability of the interrogation personnel to locate specific POWs for interrogation when preliminary reports indicated the POW to be a prime source of strategic information.
2. Interchange of identity cards between POWs or the complete discarding of cards. This allowed some knowledgeable sources (particularly officers) to assume the name and POW number of an enlisted man and thus avoid interrogation.

3. Confusion in the records of the POW camp personnel to the degree that such records were of little or no value to interrogation personnel. At times, ten to fifteen POWs had to be screened to determine the one being sought.

Actually, no segregation of POWs, which was desirable from the viewpoint of intelligence personnel, existed until the G-2 target camp was constructed and began operations on 6 February 1952. As a matter of fact Enclosure 10 (formerly Enclosure 1 and later POW Camp 2) was under the control of the 14th Field Hospital; POWs were segregated on a medical basis and no consideration was given to proper segregation as outlined in FM 19-10. However, the other POW camps fared no better as far as segregation was concerned, and all of them were greatly overcrowded. One compound at Enclosure 10 contained over two thousand POWs, not segregated by rank, nationality, or ideological group. Those who were earmarked for detailed interrogation were eventually segregated from the rest of the camp. The officers were separated from the enlisted men, but ALL went to the same spot for their food. Communication between compounds throughout the camp was no problem as the camp was not constructed to preclude this practice.

On 16 April 1952, the MISG/FE (ADV) potentials were screened and segregated into two groups: Those desiring repatriation were segregated from those who did not.

This was a step in the right direction, but was still not segregation to the degree desired by interrogation personnel. There were several glaring weaknesses in this method: First, no consideration was given to the ideological leanings of the POW. Second, those desiring repatriation for compassionate reasons were placed in a compound with those who desired repatriation for ideological reasons.

The procurement of POWs for interrogation presented problems for several reasons: The prime concern of the POW camp commander was the administration of the camp. The lack of adequate records made it difficult, sometimes impossible, to locate the POW's compound; some compounds were entirely controlled by communist elements, and neither the camp commander nor the interrogators could procure a POW from those compounds. Logistical problems were involved in moving the POWs to the interrogation center.

It was the policy to ship all POWs to the island of Koje-Do for quarantine. Since conditions on Koje-Do were not conducive to good interrogations, POWs had to be shipped back to Enclosure 10 for interrogation. Many delays were encountered. It was decided on 5 June 1952 to retain the POWs selected for

interrogation in Enclosure 10 until their interrogation was completed and then ship them to Koje-Do.

This agreement solved the procurement problem except for the withdrawal for administrative functions of POWs undergoing interrogation. Hospital cases could not be screened until released from the hospital. As segregation was based on a purely medical foundation, this resulted in collusion among POWs and, in some cases, POWs possessing valuable information had been intimidated.

Until the G-2 Target Camp was placed in operation, facilities for handling POW intelligence potentials and interrogation quarters were inadequate. The lack of good communication facilities and the existing political situation within the camps at Koje-Do precluded operations on the island.

At Enclosure 10 the interrogation unit had its interrogation compound at one end of the camp. Interrogations were carried on in winterized tents which, during the frequent power failures, had to be opened continually to admit sufficient light. Poor light, swarms of insects in warm weather, and shivering interrogators and POWs were not conducive to a maximum effort in collecting intelligence information. Many hundreds of man hours of interrogation time were lost due to the above factors. As strategic interrogations usually lasted several weeks and frequently several months, the POWs soon lost interest under the prevailing conditions.

The lack of proper segregation had a detrimental effect on the strategic interrogations being conducted. Those who were awaiting interrogation were exposed to communist agitators and to those who had been or were still being interrogated. Frequently an internee who apparently had only meager information one day was able to give detailed information the following morning, a clear indication that he had been briefed during the night. There were also occasions where an apparently knowledgeable source would "clam up" and refuse to divulge additional information—the result of intimidation and/or indoctrination. Since POWs were segregated according to their desires for repatriation and not on ideological grounds, many man hours of interrogation time were lost as some of the POWs were complaining that they were not communists but were forced to live in a communist compound.

On many occasions copies of interrogation reports of forward elements reached ADVATIS (MISG/FE (ADV) 511th MI Svc Co) too late to be of any value. The lack of understanding of the "Phase" system of interrogation resulted in a duplication of information in the various reports. Personal notebooks and other documents

which could have supplemented the interrogations never reached the rear areas where strategic interrogations were conducted.

The emphasis on personnel assigned to interrogation units seem to have been placed on the ability of the individual to speak a foreign language rather than on his general background. Many had little or no military background or knowledge of training, equipment, or operations. The inability to differentiate between positive and negative military information and to recognize valuable prisoners led to many hours wasted in interrogating useless prisoners and brought about a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the interrogator. In some instances officers appointed as team captains lacked aggressive leadership and the over-all ability to command troops. There were many instances of enlisted personnel being drafted, given basic training, and assigned to strategic interrogation on the basis of their ability to speak the Japanese language. Due to their youth—often nineteen and twenty years of age—and lack of military experience, these personnel not only were not qualified for strategic interrogations but were also disinterested in the entire program.

The 511th MI Svc Co, augmented by the attachment of Detachment 5, 6004th AISS, was activated as the final outcome of numerous conferences and letters to set up a strategic interrogation unit. Both the 511th and Detachment 5 were further augmented by DACs and DAFs to maintain the adequate working strength needed to conduct interrogations of POWs and refugees. By gearing the criteria of selection of those to interrogate to the flow of POWs, adequate coverage of intelligence information and a constant state of training was maintained.

Since no photographs or fingerprints were taken in the forward area, no positive means of identification were available by the time the POW reached the strategic interrogation unit. The 511th MI Svc Co set up a fingerprinting section when the G-2 target camp was established. Each POW was also given a camp identification number. This meant that it was possible to make a positive identification of the POW from that point on. As the preliminary interrogation reports accompanied the POWs to the G-2 Target Camp, it was possible to identify each POW with his interrogation report. In cases of doubt, agents planted in the compounds usually found out the true identity of the POW. This was an improvement over the system previously employed at the POW camps. No photographic equipment was available.

The initial segregation of POWs according to their desires for repatriation was a step in the right direction, but did not prevent contamination. G-2 AFPE, recognizing that the construction of POW camps did not provide the degree of segregation required for intelligence-gathering purposes, approved construction of a special camp and interrogation center which was known as the G-2 Target Camp. The mission of operating the camp was given to the CO, 511th MI Svc Co. In addition to the regularly assigned interrogation and administrative personnel, Group Headquarters attached a supplementary group to provide for the internal security and the administration of the Target camp. These additional personnel were given intelligence training and schooled in the most desirable methods of segregating and handling POWs.

A new method of screening was used as a basis for segregation. First, a POW was screened to determine his ideological leanings, all incoming POWs being divided into two groups: Communist and non-Communist. Then the Chinese were separated from the Koreans and the officers from the enlisted men. The above were further divided into those who were pending interrogation, those undergoing interrogation, and those who had been interrogated. Those who were not selected for interrogation were shipped out through normal POW channels. AT NO TIME, HOWEVER, WAS THE POW QUESTIONED AS TO HIS DESIRES CONCERNING REPATRIATION; for, had segregation been made on this basis, the same situation would have existed as did in the POW camps. With segregation being made according to the ideological leanings of the POWs, however, there was no mixing of communist and anti-communist elements and the problems previously experienced ceased to exist.

Since the administration of the G-2 Target Camp was keyed to meet the requirements of the interrogation center and since, with the exception of the sick and wounded, all POWs were channeled through the Target Camp, the problem of procuring POWs for interrogation was solved. The logistical problem which existed earlier was solved by holding all POWs scheduled for detailed interrogation at the Target Camp until the completion of such interrogation. Sick call for POWs was held prior to the arrival of the interrogators, and no POWs were withheld for work details or administrative purposes. Consequently, POW targets were always available for interrogation.

Facilities for the interrogation of POWs were ideal. The interrogation center consisted of ten prefabricated buildings, each subdivided into ten interrogation booths and having a large space at the end for the team captain's desk and for

storage of reference material and maps. Latrine facilities, as well as a waiting room, were provided in another building so that it was unnecessary for either interrogators or those to interrogate to leave the interrogation compound. Still another building housed the operations and administration personnel, the reference library and a conference-schoolroom. All buildings were well lighted and contained additional outlets for lamps. Generators were kept on a stand-by basis in the event of failure of the local power sources. All buildings were well ventilated and contained sufficient space heaters to warm the rooms during the coldest days. In addition, since camp personnel fired the heaters in the early morning hours, the buildings were warm when interrogations were begun and no interrogation time was lost. Messing facilities, showers, dispensary, and recreation areas were available for both interrogation personnel and POWs.

With segregation made on the basis of ideological screenings, the problem of indoctrination of POWs continued but on a small scale, and only in a manner that was an aid rather than a detriment to the interrogation effort. Indoctrination by anti-Communist POWs of those internees who were ideologically undecided or indifferent frequently resulted in a more co-operative attitude on the part of the POW and in a saving of interrogation time and an increase in information obtained. Moreover, such indoctrination was strictly controlled by the camp and interrogation personnel through the use of agents and informers within the compounds. On the other hand, since the number of Communist POWs being captured was small, normal segregation by rank and nationality so diminished the number in each compound that routine surveillance prevented procommunist POWs from indoctrinating or coercing the others.

A natural tendency to impress the interrogator favorably resulted in the briefing of POWs under interrogation by other POWs in the same compound. However, this problem was overcome by several methods. First, those being interrogated were made to understand that only his personal knowledge or qualified hearsay was of value to the UNC. Second, POWs were not allowed to mingle while within the interrogation compound. Third, the compound leader was instructed to prohibit briefings within his compound, and violations were reported by agents and informers.

Conferences between the CO, 511th MI Svc Co, the operations officer, 302d MI Svc Co, and the CO, POW Escort Guard Co, KCOMZ resulted in a verbal agreement concerning prompt delivery of POW Document Envelopes. It was agreed that a POW document envelope for each POW shipped be handed over to the POW

Escort Guard officer. Each envelope was to contain a copy of each preliminary interrogation report written on a POW, or an envelope was sent with a notation giving the reasons why a report had not been published. Envelopes of suspected communists or agents were marked with a code that had been previously agreed upon. Hospital cases were also coded. These envelopes were turned over to the POW Escort Guard officer, who in turn gave them to the G-2 Target Camp Commander. For the first time documents were arriving at the same time as the POW, a situation which proved extremely useful in the screening process.

CAPTURED AND CONFISCATED DOCUMENTS

With the fall of PYONGYANG imminent in October 1950, it was evident that the North Korean capital would yield a wealth of intelligence from documentary material if such documents could be seized intact. Upon receipt of an order from CG, Eighth United States Army Korea, dated 16 October 1950, and Special Operational Instructions, HQ Eighth United States Army Korea, dated 17 October 1950, the CG, 2d Infantry Division, on 16 October directed the Division G-2 to organize and command a company-size task force which was to seize and secure designated targets in PYONGYANG containing documents of intelligence value. This unit was designated Task Force Indianhead.

The task force consisted of one platoon of medium tanks (not committed), one reconnaissance platoon, one infantry company (less one platoon), one engineer squad (demolition experts), aid men as selected, and G-2 personnel organized into seven task force teams, each of which consisted of one CIC agent (in charge), one assistant CIC agent, one Korean guide, and two Korean linguists. The mission of the Task Force was to enter PYONGYANG with advance elements of I US Corps and/or II ROK Corps and to seize and secure documents relevant to military operational plans (especially those concerning past and expected future aid from foreign countries). Two secondary missions for the Task Force were Target Project Alpha, which was to locate certain personalities in PYONGYANG, and Target Project Beta, which was to locate certain NK organizations within the city.

By 23 October the final exploitation of all primary and secondary targets had been accomplished.

An additional twelve targets of opportunity were exploited by 25 October 1950.

During the period 21 October 1950 through 29 November 1950 a total of 35,393 documents, comprising 3,834,508 pages, was shipped back to Headquarters

500th MI Service Group in Tokyo. Of this total, 564 documents, comprising 27,261 pages, were classified "A" documents, or documents of theater interest.

The basic plan was sound and practicable; however, a number of problems arose which could have been avoided if more time had been spent in training and planning. The Task Force lacked specialized personnel such as experienced intelligence analysts, personnel experienced in the exploitation of documents, and technical intelligence personnel. Documents and equipment could have been more efficiently classified if such personnel had been attached to the Task Force. Operations would have progressed more smoothly if tactical commanders had been notified of the possible employment in the Task Force in their zones of action. When organizing a Task Force of the size and scope of Indianhead, provision should be made for training of tactical personnel in seizing and scouring targets, house-to-house fighting techniques, and the protection of target papers, books, documents, and material.

CAPTURED AND CONFISCATED DOCUMENTS

The 500th Military Intelligence Service Group (MISG) was the agency responsible for the co-ordination and exploitation of all captured documents taken in the Korean operation. This centralized control was to ensure the maximum utilization of scarce-category linguists and the maximum exploitation of intelligence from captured documents for dissemination to all levels of command.

With the co-operation of G-2 ROK Army, G-2 Eighth Army, and G-2 KMAG, a series of visits was made at appropriate times to G-2 ROKA by personnel from HQ 500th MISG. These visits were made for the purpose of establishing operating procedures whereby all documents would be fully exploited to the mutual advantage of both sides.

An agreement was reached whereby all captured documents, irrespective of capturing units, would be forwarded to Headquarters 500th MISG through 302d MISG. Documents captured by ROK Army units were to be screened at Headquarters 500th MISG and then returned to Section V, G-2, and ROK Army through 302d MISG within a period of forty-five days. This was considered an improvement over previous arrangements, since it afforded for the first time full exploitation of all captured documents without undue delay; however, it denied UNC Headquarters the right to retain indefinitely such documents as personal identification cards, etc. which were required for covert purposes.

In August 1952 a visit was made to assist G-2 Eighth Army in the exploitation of documents captured by ROK Army and to co-ordinate processing of documents between 302d MISG and Headquarters 500th MISG. During this visit a total of 11,250 pages of documents not previously reported by ROKA were scanned, of which 2,395 pages were referred back to Headquarters 500th MISG for full exploitation.

CHAPTER VI
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
CLEARANCES

Prior to cessation of hostilities in Korea in July 1953, Hq Eighth Army received and processed a monthly average of approximately fifteen hundred requests for personnel security investigations and clearances initiated by staff sections of that Headquarters and by subordinate units and activities. Of this number, approximately twelve percent were requests for background investigations for individuals whose duties required access to either TOP SECRET or cryptological information and material classified up to and including SECRET. Temporary or interim clearances issued were, in all cases, based solely on information contained in the DD Form 398, Statement of Personal History, on the individual concerned and on results of checks of available files and records. However, almost without exception, the checks of available files and records resulted in the negative. Results of completed National Agency Checks were received from six to nine months after the requests were submitted and the results of completed background investigations were received from ten to fourteen months subsequent to initiation of requests. Approximately fifty percent of the results received pertained to personnel who had previously departed the Far East Command upon completion of their tours of overseas duty as established by the then-existent rotation policy.

Although current DA relations were adhered to in granting temporary or interim clearances for classified information and material, the situation was believed to be contrary to the best interests of national security. The granting of such clearances is based solely on the basis of the Statement of Personal History and results of checks of very limited available files and records may well have been to the advantage of individuals with subversive intent. Such personnel could conceivably, through falsification or omission of information in Statements of Personal History, occupy sensitive positions and remain in such undetected positions until such time as the results were obtained.

A minimum of six months elapsed in those cases involving access to information and material classified up to and including SECRET. In those cases involving cryptographic or TOP SECRET information and material, a minimum of ten months elapsed. Subversives could have had access to classified information and material until results were received or until they departed the overseas command upon rotation. Another problem was to insure the expeditious notification to higher

headquarters of the transfer of personnel restricted to non-sensitive duties because of sufficient credible information reflecting on their loyalty, character, discretion, and integrity. In many instances, upon recheck of the status of those individuals by G2, AFFE, it was discovered that the personnel had been transferred months before and the counterintelligence file upon which restriction was based had been held by the parent organization. The failure of the losing organization to forward the notification of this transfer and file served to minimize the effectiveness of this portion of the security program and greatly complicated the tasks of the gaining command in weeding out undesirable personnel. This problem was not limited to the Korean Theater or the Command as a whole—many personnel were transferred to this Command from CONUS who were the subjects of counterintelligence files. Notification of the disqualifying information was received in several instances some months after the individual arrived in this command.

In addition to losses of personnel through battle casualties, non-combat medical reasons, and rotation—all of which contributed to the rapid turn-over of personnel in sensitive duties—Eighth Army was faced with the presence of aliens in the U. S. Forces in Korea which decreased to a degree the number of available personnel who might be considered and selected for positions requiring access to classified information and material. Since limited Access Authorizations could not be granted to an alien member of the U. S. Forces prior to the completion of favorable background investigation and polygraph examination, and since, due to operational necessity, the need for personnel who could be placed in sensitive positions was immediate, the selection of personnel who could be granted temporary or interim clearances required careful consideration. Lack of qualified personnel who had prior training for positions requiring access to classified information and material further limited the number of those who could be selected. In many instances, in order to maintain efficient operations, commanders knowingly selected for sensitive duties trained personnel with short periods of service in Korea remaining rather than those with long service periods remaining but who were untrained. The resultant rapid turn-over of personnel contributed substantially to the large numbers of requests received for personnel security investigations and clearances.

PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT AND ROTATION FOR CIC DETACHMENTS IN KOREA

During the period July 1950 to December 1950, a total of fifteen CIC combat detachments were activated from the 441st CIC Detachment personnel for duty in Korea. Total authorized strength for CIC in Korea was 376 personnel, over one-third of 441st authorized strength. Loss replacements for these detachments were provided also by the 441st CIC Detachment. Replacements for the 441st CIC Detachment were obtained from CIC sources in the ZI. In order to insure that a maximum number of CIC personnel would be given the opportunity of gaining CIC combat experience and to retain combat effectiveness of the CIC units in Korea, an intra-theater rotation program was considered to be a logical necessity.

After careful study and consideration relative to the time spent in pipeline, it was determined that the SOP for processing and assigning all CIC personnel replacements from CONUS to the various CIC detachments in the Far East was costly and time consuming. The prevailing policy was to ship all replacements from CONUS to Yokohama or Haneda Airport, then to the Camp Drake Replacement Depot. They remained there until the personnel officer at Camp Drake procured assignment information from the commanding officer, 441st CIC Detachment. This procedure placed an unnecessary burden on the Camp Drake Replacement Depot in that all personnel, irrespective of ultimate assignment, had to attend and participate in a general orientation and personnel processing. Furthermore, the Replacement Depot had to spend needless time in requesting assignment instructions from Hq, 441st CIC Detachment. Personnel were delayed for a period of several days to one week at Camp Drake, and those ultimately assigned to the 441st had to go through an orientation and processing program similar to the one they had already undergone. A more serious disadvantage was that during the course of processing at Camp Drake, there was a tendency to compromise CIC personnel.

Because of the small number of CIC replacements arriving from ZI, rotation could be effected only between Korea and Japan. Operation Rotate, as devised by Hq, 441st CIC Detachment and approved by the ACofS, G2 and G1, FEC, established a rotation criteria of six months in a division type CIC or twelve months in Army, Corps and Port-type CIC Detachments; a maximum of fifty-two personnel was established as the monthly rotation figure from Korea to Japan with an equal number of replacements being furnished each month by the 441st. Replacements were to arrive in the Korean CIC unit and be briefed by the rotates prior to the latter's departure for Japan. The 441st, therefore, served as a pipeline.

In order to correct the time lost in pipeline status for replacements, a directive was issued that all future assignments of CIC personnel to the Far East would be made directly to the 441st CIC Detachment. The intra-theater program proved a most satisfactory stopgap arrangement pending arrival of adequate CIC replacements from the ZI. No concomitant problems were created as a result of the intra-theater rotation program.

The new program, eliminating the time lost by CIC replacements in the pipeline, was immediately implemented and its advantages became apparent within a few weeks. Personnel arriving from the ZI were moved directly to Headquarters, 441st CIC Detachment. This arrangement produced the following results:

1. Removed the burden of orientation and processing CIC personnel at the Camp Drake Replacement Depot.
2. Decreased the amount of time spent in pipeline status from approximately seven days to several hours.
3. Assured greater security and prevented compromise of CIC personnel.
4. Eliminated duplication of orientation and processing of personnel.
5. Afforded greater opportunity to screen the individual's qualifications, thus resulting in a more scientific assignment.

CAPTURED AMERICAN PERSONNEL

Shortly after the entry of the United States into the Korean conflict, it became apparent that many United States prisoners held by the Communists were writing statements, making broadcasts, signing peace appeals, and committing other acts which were detrimental to the best interests of the United States. Information to this effect came from behind the Bamboo Curtain by radio, propaganda leaflets, booklets, and through the mail.

No plan existed whereby one central agency would gather data pertaining to Communist-held prisoners who were committing acts which were detrimental to the best interests of the United States. The 441st CIC Detachment established a central control section within the Background Branch to gather and compile data into individual dossiers on prisoners mentioned in, or collected with, any type of communication which favored or benefitted the Communists. This section kept the dossiers current by adding newly obtained information or cross-referencing reports when more than one name was mentioned. Upon implementation of

"Little Switch," Department of the Army directed establishment of a control file on each returnee.

The dossier established on each returnee became the basic part of the control file. Prior to interrogation, each returnee's dossier was made available to the interrogator for background information and to form a basis for direct questioning. Upon completion of the counterintelligence and military intelligence processing, the basic dossier and the results of the interrogation were combined into one control file. The 441st CIC Detachment devoted considerable time and effort to complete the reproduction of the original dossier to accompany the returnee on his departure from the Far East. Subsequently, these dossiers were forwarded to ACofS, G2, of the gaining command. Upon implementation of "Big Switch," each dossier had to be made in one extra copy for retention by the ACofS, G2, AFFE.

The dossiers on captured American personnel proved beneficial as a source of background information on each prisoner and assisted in determining preliminary classifications as security risks. The dossiers also formed the basis for strategically and psychologically directed interrogations. The reproduction process enabled AFFE to make available to the gaining command, simultaneously with the arrival of the returnee, all pertinent information developed during the processing.

KOREAN TERRAIN HELPFUL TO ENEMY AGENTS

The terrain between North and South Korea provides no natural barriers that might serve to prevent the infiltration of enemy agents into South Korea. Off shore, and outflanking the friendly MLR, are many islands with freak tides, currents and mud flats that provide easy passageway for traffic between North and South Korea. The many mountainous ridges running from North to South also provide convenient avenues which have never been entirely sealed off.

The problem presented by the terrain was solved by maximum co-ordination between all agencies to assure as complete coverage as could be afforded by personnel available. Enemy agents were rendered conspicuous by the establishment of an area extending from the MLR to a "Stay Back" line. Civilians were kept to a minimum in this area; therefore, security agents kind little difficulty in subjecting all civilians to a vigorous scrutiny. Routes penetrating the MLR were covered by ambush patrols. Check points were set up to screen all traffic along the MLR, manned by U.S. and Korean personnel, and assured adequate travel control. Joint operation was essential since the language barrier precluded adequate screening of individuals by another nationality. Additional

checkpoints were set up at boat landings, railroads, and bridges. Naval patrols, friendly partisan forces, and port security agencies attempted to check all travel between the islands. Apprehended agents were given a complete and exhaustive interrogation at the earliest possible opportunity to extract information pertaining to their route of travel through the MLR and on other agents that might be following at later dates so that they might be intercepted. The solutions developed are believed to be adequate, and this problem will be present to a certain degree in any combat situation.

THREAT OF SABOTAGE DURING HOSTILITIES IN KOREA

The threat of operations of sabotage nature in Japan was of continuing concern to G2 as a result of the hostilities in Korea and the subsequent military armistice negotiations. Targets for sabotage were numerous, particularly in the field of power, communications, and transportation. A successful disruption of any of these primary targets could have adversely affected the United Nations' operations in Korea. Constant investigation and subsequent analysis formed the basis for plans with which to counter this potential threat.

In furthering this effort, spot reports of all incidents which could conceivably have been sabotage were immediately transmitted to G2, AFFE. To augment the continuing positive action being taken in connection with the potential sabotage threat, a counter plan was immediately implemented. Informants, all police, governmental investigative agencies, and press sources were thoroughly covered with even greater emphasis. With the possibility of retaliation by released indigenous employees from installations supporting the United Nations Command, the "Post-Armistice Plans, Counter-Subversive Activities" were emphasized by more frequent security surveys, security lectures to installation personnel, reviewing Troop Information and Education lectures, and re-screening all indigenous employees. Liaison was extended to all responsible officers of Marine ground and air forces, and all other units recently assigned in Japan. The purpose and intent of the reference letter was explained and the services of CIC in the implementation of this program were emphasized and explained to all unit commanders and/or security officers.

Several alleged sabotage attempts were reported, but none were confirmed. The result of investigation and analysis of alleged sabotage incidents for the period 25 June 1950 to 27 July 1953 failed to reflect any large-scale, or any trend in, sabotage operations. Therefore, the conclusion was that sabotage, as a primary

threat in Japan, represented a potentiality rather than an actuality for the period covered.

NORTH KOREAN AND OTHER ESPIONAGE AGENTS IN JAPAN

With the advent of the Korean War it became apparent that the Communist-controlled countries, especially North Korea, would intensify their espionage activities in Japan. CIC was aware of this and increased its coverage of targets which it believed Communist agents would attempt to penetrate. In August 1950, the first big break came with the apprehension of a North Korean major, the controlling agent of one of the cells of the North Korean Espionage Ring in Japan. Under interrogation he unfolded a fantastic tale of operations by the ring. Through leads developed from this interrogation, many arrests were made and much of the agents' work was nullified. In some cases, agents were "doubled," which enabled CIC to cover the other cells of the ring operating in Japan. There were many problems encountered in the investigation. First, the Communists attach great importance to espionage and intelligence work in general; consequently, it was easy for the agents to obtain needed funds, supplies, and personnel from their headquarters in Korea. The second big obstacle was the lack of effective espionage laws in Japan under which these agents could be prosecuted. Many other general aspects made investigation difficult. Among these were the fact that the Koreans in Japan owe no particular allegiance to either Korea or Japan, which made for easy recruitment of espionage agents. Even those Koreans not ideologically inclined toward Communism or North Korea could be recruited readily. The ease of getting agents into and out of Japan by illegal means and the relative ease of providing identity documents for illegal entrants, together with the usual oriental indiscriminate use of aliases, made their movements difficult to follow. Because of the propinquity of Japan and Korea, vast numbers of the residents of both countries engaged in smuggling operations and used these operations for their espionage purposes, thus securing a ready-made means of getting agents and information into and out of Japan. Through smuggling rings already established or newly created rings, profits from illegal transactions were used to finance the operations of the espionage ring. There was no language barrier to hamper or restrict the activities of the Korean espionage agents, since the majority of the Koreans speak Japanese fluently. High-level penetration into Japanese governmental agencies by Korean agents revealed United States' activities and intentions in Japan. As a result of the Administrative Agreement and the Peace Treaty, CIC was prevented from making arrests or raids and conducting investigations.

The fact that there is no espionage law in Japan allowed the North Korean agents to conduct their espionage operations with relative impunity. To circumvent this situation, espionage agents were apprehended and charged with other offenses which they committed, e.g., illegal entry or smuggling. After serving a minor sentence for these offenses they were deported to Korea where there are more stringent laws for espionage. Here they are re-arrested, this time charged with violation of the espionage laws. CIC agents were thus enabled to interrogate these agents personally, and obtain additional information which might have been overlooked by the Japanese police or which reflected unfavorably on the Japanese government.

The illegal entry and exit of North Korean agents was, to a great extent, curtailed by increased vigilance of the South Korean and Japanese Coast Guards. Before the Korean War ships were actually chartered to smuggle and transport illegal entrants. With the beginning of hostilities and more thorough screening by the authorities the ring resorted to smuggling individual agents into the country on legitimately operated ships. This meant that there was no mass saturation of the country with agents. CIC relied on inside informants to give information on these new agents when they made their contacts.

Although these agents entered the country illegally, it was imperative that they secure Foreign National Registration Certificates from the Japanese Government so that they could travel throughout the country without fear of arrest. Many were able to obtain these certificates through connivance with corrupt ward officials, but the fact that a picture of the applicant had to be on file neutralized the extensive use of aliases. Information was received on other active agents by having an informant search thousands of registration cards.

Although the Administrative Agreement and Peace Treaty prevented CIC from actually making arrests and raids, they did prove beneficial in other ways. Because of effective liaison with Japanese authorities, the police were able to do most of the work normally performed by CIC. Thus, the CIC could expand the scope of its investigation. For example, one CIC agent was able to direct the investigative activities of an entire police section. Besides the check the Japanese police made of agents in Japan, a further check was made by CIC in Korea when the agents were sent there for further interrogation and prosecution.

The system of arrest, detention, and thorough interrogation was effective in that many of the controlling enemy agents were removed from circulation. The transmittal of vital information and free liaison between enemy agents and North

Korean authorities was controlled and curtailed, and espionage operations by North Korean agents in general were retarded.

CHAPTER VII CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Intelligence

a. In any future operation similar to the Korean hostilities, steps should be taken as early as possible to insure procurement and proper utilization of linguist personnel. The final solution to the problem is long-range in nature and involves policies and decisions that lie beyond the jurisdiction of any single theater command. Steps should be taken not only to train an adequate number of linguists to meet the needs of any area wherein US military operations are probable, but to train these linguists in military terminology. There appears to be a tendency for the selection of personnel for language training to be based on such factors as racial origin without regard for the individual's basic knowledge of English. In this connection a large number of linguists were ineffective despite their fluency in Chinese or Korean. This was particularly true in the case of many Americans of Oriental parentage who had learned a smattering of two languages in their homes but had not progressed much beyond a childhood vocabulary in either. Unfortunately, higher general aptitude test scores do not necessarily reflect language ability or even ability to work well in English. An adequate knowledge of English should be as important a consideration in the selection of candidates for linguist training as racial or national background. Language qualifications should not be a criteria for intelligence duties. Assignment procedures should be corrected to insure the linguistic requirements of non-intelligence agencies are met.

b. Although intelligence schools are able to provide students with many of the necessary intelligence techniques, local conditions must be learned while actually on the job. Because our rotation policy, on-the-job orientation must be given rapidly if personnel are to attain maximum efficiency in time to be of value to the command. All enlisted linguist and order-of-battle personnel should have the following qualifications:

- (1) Clearance for access to at least CONFIDENTIAL information at time of reporting for duty.
- (2) Familiarity with military terminology.
- (3) Translation and/or interrogation ability.

(4) Aptitude Area score of at least 100.

(5) Have completed basic course in general military intelligence.

c. The mission and T/O of ground liaison teams should be reviewed to determine what will constitute an adequate organizational structure based on Air Force organization and Army requirements. All ground liaison personnel should be required to attend a complete course of instruction in air-ground operations.

d. In the event hostilities are resumed, the capture of POWs should be stressed as a tactical requirement of all units in combat. Complete and thorough indoctrination should be given troops on the importance of getting POWs back to the echelons where all the information that the POW may have can be obtained through thorough interrogation. More patrols should be dispatched with the specific mission of capturing POWs, and the Psychological Warfare effort to encourage defection of enemy troops should be fully exploited. The Army Intelligence Officer should be given the opportunity, when necessary, to interrogate POWs as soon after capture as possible to determine the extent of their intelligence potential.

e. During a period of non-hostility, training to indoctrinate troops should be continuous. This program should be conducted to include visual and sound demonstrations and the use of enemy materiel.

f. (1) Frequent and detailed coverage is necessary to expedite identification of troop activity and equipment. Photographic reconnaissance aircraft for both day and night photography should be equipped with cameras which will provide 1/5000 scale coverage for an extended period of time, and which will permit maximum advantage to be taken of the altitude, speed, and range of the aircraft. These cameras should have a greater focal length, a greater recycling speed, and a greater film Capacity than those used during the Korean conflict, and they should have air adjustable mounts allowing increase or decrease Of camera angle for oblique work.

(2) The methods used in PI work in Korea were essentially those of World War II. The increasing demand for photo maps by PI personnel at all command levels created considerable duplication of effort which was extremely difficult to avoid. Each combat unit in any future operation will need appropriate photographic coverage; however, the number of personnel and the time required in providing

PI must be reduced. Improved methods in the application of aerial photography to obtain military intelligence are needed; photographic interpretation is an essential tool in warfare. Studies should be made to include both technical and tactical fields, with the purpose of reducing the cost drastically without a corresponding reduction in quality.

g. Great stress should be placed upon proper collection and relaying of bomb-damage information because of its importance to the close air support operations. Ground and air observation on such targets should be used more extensively to help alleviate deficiencies. A satisfactory medium for securing information of front-line activities is the artillery forward observer communications system to the FSCC. From the FSCC at division and corps headquarters, the information can be forwarded to the information section at JCC. This section would then disseminate the information to the tactical air bases, adjacent army units as required, and G-2 and G-3 Air. Recommended changes to the bomb line could be handled in the same manner. Recommended solution is sound; however, it must be remembered that many parts of the battle area in Korea were bombarded with such regularity that it became impossible to assess damage either visually or photographically. In normal cases, the target must be photographed as soon as possible after the strike.

2. Counterintelligence

a. An aggressive implementation of current counterintelligence directives to all echelons, emphasizing the close accountability of all restrictees, alleviated to a marked degree the possibility of such individual transfer without notification to a higher command. A command-wide report directed by AFFE required the lower commanders to set up a system of accounting for such restrictees every two months. The effectiveness of this plan was checked by IG and G-2 inspections to insure compliance. All personnel should be required to submit PHSs and fingerprint cards upon entering the service and these forms should be filed at the G-2 Central Records Facility. All officers and first three grades of NCO class should be cleared for access to at least CONFIDENTIAL information before they are declared POR qualified.

b. Proper classification of information was not always made; a great number of documents were over classified. Officers authorized to classify information should

be thoroughly informed of the classification criteria as outlined in existing directives.

c. The handling by lower echelons of all cases involving the transfer of personnel restricted to non-sensitive duties must be expedited. Lateral dissemination of this personnel information by agencies outside the theater is essential in similar situations.